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Abstract
In this thesis, I problematize the United States’ response to the global phenomenon
characterized as human trafficking. The framing of trafficking as policy issue takes place in
the context of politicized claims about the nature and prevalence of trafficking, its relation to
the sex industry, and the kind of response that is required. U.S. anti-trafficking policy was
built and shaped in the context of fears about immigration, global labor, and the sex industry.
As a result, trafficking has been used to justify oppressive domestic reactions such as border
crackdown, scrutiny of immigrant and sex worker communities, and victim “protection” that
barely differs from prosecution. The United States has also leveraged anti-trafficking
measures such as the policy prescriptions in the Trafficking in Persons Report and sanctions
for countries that fall in the bottom tier to build a global response to trafficking that suits the
hegemony of the United States rather than the needs of vulnerable populations. Through the
government-subsidized “rescue industry”—an army of U.S.-based NGO’s and humanitarian
groups—the United States has effectively exported an imperialistic response to trafficking
based on Christian ethics and neoliberal economics around the world. These policies are
distinctly out of touch with the experiences and needs of the supposed “victims of
trafficking,” those attempting to survive at the bottom of global capitalist labor markets. As a
result, I characterize anti-trafficking as a form of structural violence, and emphasize the need
for an alternative movement that addresses the actual problems experienced by global
laborers and the complicity of the United States in creating the conditions for labor
exploitation.
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Introduction
It ought to concern every person, because it’s a debasement of our common humanity. It
ought to concern every community, because it tears at the social fabric. It ought to concern
every business, because it distorts markets. It ought to concern every nation, because it
endangers public health and fuels violence and organized crime. I’m talking about the
injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which must be called by its true name—modern
slavery….Our fight against human trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of our
time, and the United States will continue to lead it.
-President Barack Obama, September 25, 2012
In February 2013, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act was passed
in the United States Senate with a majority of 93-5, passing in the House with a majority of
286-138 after being amended onto the reauthorized Violence Against Women Act
(GovTrack). Headed by a bipartisan coalition between Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat,
Vermont) and Senator Marco Rubio (Republican, Florida), the passage of the TVPRA
signified a point of cooperation for the 113th Congress, a governing body so riven by
partisanship that 8 months later disagreement in over budgetary concerns would lead to a
government shutdown. In a congress that could agree on almost nothing, the unanimous
passage of anti-trafficking legislation indicated the simple truth that anti-trafficking has a
powerful ability to generate consensus and mobilize action.
Commonly called “modern-day slavery,” trafficking has been taken up as the pet
cause of politicians, activists, movie stars, and journalists throughout the world, but
particularly in the United States. These self-described “abolitionists” claim that trafficking is
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one of the most pressing humanitarian issues we currently face. Homogenous narratives that
capitalize upon the absolute extremes of human misery, sweeping statistics, and emotive calls
to action have come to define anti-trafficking discourse: it is an movement with little room
for critique, and almost no room for self-reflection. legislation highlights the simple truth that
anti-trafficking has been accepted as an unambiguous imperative. “Trafficking” is codified in
both policy and practice as an identifiable problem and abuse of human rights. While
discussions continue about how to define, quantify, and end trafficking, only a small handful
of voices on the margins of discourse question the accuracy and efficacy of anti-trafficking as
a movement for justice. The real debate about human trafficking has in many ways, already
been won.
The 2008 documentary Call + Response epitomizes the rare unity that journalists,
activists, and politicians have exhibited around the issue of trafficking. The pet project of
musician Justin Dillon, Call + Response brings together some of the most significant voices
in anti-trafficking discourse, including politicians Madeline Albright, Chris Smith, and John
Miller; celebrity activists Julia Ormond and Ashley Judd; non-governmental organizers Gary
Haugen, Kevin Bales, and David Batstone; and journalist Nicholas Kristof who has made an
international name for himself through emotive reporting on the “faces of modern slavery.”
Dillon’s own contribution is a pastiche of musical performances from him and his friends—
indeed, much of the film is spent justifying his approach by comparing Dillon’s music to the
rich history of music that emanated from Black slavery, the Jim Crow south, and the Civil
Rights movement. Dillon imagines his anti-trafficking initiative as “an open-source
movement.” “Everybody just simply needs to write their code on top of it,” Dillon says,
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“What are you good at? What do you care about? Has this issue touched you in a way?
What’s your response going to be?”
The dramatic narrative created by the documentary leans heavily on contextless
images of brown and black children, who are largely silent. Celebrity and UN Goodwill
Ambassador Julia Ormond offers this anecdote: “I pretty much always ask the victims what
they want to say, what they want to get out as a message, or what they want to say to the UN,
that we should be doing to help you. Mostly they say, tell my story, talk about what has
happened to me.” Telling the story of the victims is left largely up to Ormond and her peers—
the rare intercessions by the “victims” of trafficking are always framed within the assertions
of the experts about the nature of trafficking. There is also a consistency within the stories
chosen to illustrate the claims that the film makes about the nature of trafficking. The
Manichean dichotomy between traffickers and victims is highlighted by the extreme youth of
the victims portrayed, the majority of whom are very young girls. Footage from hidden
cameras of men posing as johns as they attempt to solicit sex from children, images of
middle-aged white men walking hand in hand with teenagers, the huddled forms of women
locked into a room—the documentary is not subtle in its mission to evoke an emotional
reaction. Adult victims of trafficking and non-sex sector victims are hardly included at all: as
Kristof says in the film, “just focus on these kids who are being kidnapped and forced into
prostitution” (Call + Response).
The normative account trafficking presented in Call + Response is so common-place
that narratives of trafficking begin to seem like “well-rehearsed scripts: the prison-like
brothel, the lured or deceived female victim, and her heroic rescuers” (Soderlund, 77). The
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choice to tell stories in this way is as practical as it is ideological. Janie Chuang argues that
the prevalence of these narratives represents the “ideological capture” of the anti-trafficking
movement by media stars, whose goal of turning emotional response into action results in the
privileging of the most “mediagenic” narratives:
The reductive narrative of trafficking as being about women and children forced into
prostitution resonates because of its simple narrative structure, with a bad guy (evil
trafficker or deviant, sex-crazed male) doing bad things (sexual violence or
enslavement) to an innocent, ignorant, impoverished victim (trafficked woman or
child, sex slave, or prostitute). (Chuang, 1698).
The resonance of this narrative contributes to its repetition, in a cycle of media scandal that
reproduces similar sex trafficking narratives so consistently that a particular response is not
only suggested, but mandated by the moral outrage of the public. Trafficking, in this telling,
can be broken down into dichotomies that “deemphasize the structural factors that encourage
trafficking, subsuming them under a framework of the personal motivations of evil traffickers
(greed, power, callousness, and contempt for women)” (Vance, 938). The need for a response
is presented as ethically unambiguous: to fight trafficking is to be on the side of good—the
complicity of anti-trafficking advocates in systems that create injustice and inequality is
never the question.
Anti-trafficking has brought together politicians, NGOs, the media, and the public in
a campaign that has extended far beyond the borders of the nation—trafficking is a global
issue, and the United States has positioned itself in the fight against it. Claims made about the
nature of problems may or may not reflect the realities of these problems (Best, 1990).
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Instead, claims makers tailor the description of the nature and causes of the problem to
invoke particular types of official responses (Stone, 1989). This process, known as “frame
making,” can be manufactured or manipulated by claims makers who use the media to
disseminate particular messages to encourage certain interpretations of a social problem and
discourage others. (Farrell and Fahy, 618). The lack of mainstream debate around trafficking
suggests that trafficking, as a framework for understanding particular human rights
violations, has been widely accepted. If anti-trafficking activism relies on constructed
understandings of a problem, who constructed the trafficking framework? How did they
construct it, and for what purpose has it been used? Perhaps most importantly, why have
these questions been largely absent from mainstream understandings of trafficking? In an era
of polarized media and partisan politics, why is there consensus surrounding this one issue?
The history of anti-trafficking is certainly not a neutral one: the movement’s historical
roots can be traced back to the Victorian fears about “White Slavery.” At the turn of the 20th
century, sensationalized media stories about white women being entrapped by procurers and
sold in overseas flesh markets, exacerbated by fears about immigration led to a panic about
an ultimately fictitious “White Slave Trade.” While activists frequently speak of antitrafficking as a modern crisis, the ascent of the trafficking framework to the lexicon of policy
actually took place as a result of this movement over a century ago. The beginning of the
White Slave panic can be traced to 1885, when journalist W.T. Stead published a largely
manufactured account of young girls being sold into “sexual slavery” in London’s brothels.
Stead contrasted women who “fall either by the seduction of individuals or by the temptation
which well-dressed vice can offer to the poor” with the undeserving victims of “organized
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rape,” young girls “snared, trapped and outraged wither when under the influence of drugs or
after a prolonged struggle in a locked room” (Stead). Stead’s dramatic narrative about the
rape of unwitting and unwilling girls—strikingly reminiscent of the narratives perpetrated in
modern trafficking discourse such as Call + Response—triggered international outrage. Soon,
more reports emerged of white girls and young women who had been “discovered” in
brothels overseas, stolen from their homelands by immigrant men of color. Very quickly,
“white slavery” metastasized into a “white slave traffic” in which Jewish, Arab, black, and
Asian men supposedly procured white women for sale in the dark continents, where demand
for the sexual purity of white girls was high. Public fear heightened, and there was an outcry
for political response. In the United States, the Mann Act of 1910 (still used today to aid in
the persecution of trafficking offenses) made it illegal to transport a woman across state lines
for the purpose of prostitution. The Act, called the White-Slave Traffic Act at the time of its
passage, was heavily leveraged against men of color as supposed threats to white female
purity (Luibheid). Through the Mann Act, panic about White Slavery manifested as a
limitation the mobility of women classified as prostitutes, and persecution/deportation of
immigrant men.
Since most accounts about White Slavery have since been to discovered to be largely
constructed, critics such as Joe Doezema have since argued that White Slavery was in fact a
cultural “myth” around which fears about race, class, gender, and international migration
coalesced. The racism fostered by the panic is implicit in the name itself, “implying as it does
that slavery of white women was of a different, and worse, sort than black slavery. In
America, in particular, this contrast was explicitly used to downplay the black slavery

7
experience” (Doezema 2000, 30). Women of color were excluded from the category: their
innocence and protection was never a concern. The fear and outrage that accompanied the
supposed abduction and rape of young white women and girls and the literal panic it inspired
based on little to no evidential truth is particularly appalling when held in contrast to the
institutionalized and legally sanctioned rape of black women under slavery. The White
Slavery scare thus “subverted rather than challenged the racialized understanding of slavery,”
a history of appropriation that has held little weight with the activists who so liberally utilize
the term “modern slavery” today (O’Brien et. al. 2).
In the modern crusade to end trafficking, three distinct interest groups have emerged
in relation to the trafficking framework. “Abolitionism” was a term frequently adopted by
activists who fought the fictitious “white slave trade” by which these activists—both
feminists fighting for the elimination of a market for sex, and religious “social purity”
reformers who believed that prostitution degraded society—meant the abolition of virtually
all (white) prostitution. In the context of the history of anti-trafficking, abolitionism is a
clearly articulated position associated not only with labor, but with sex. The adoption of the
term by the modern anti-trafficking movement traces back to the work of feminist Kathleen
Berry, whose 1979 tract on traffficking Female Sexual Slavery brought sex trafficking and
abuse of prostitutes (in her language) into the feminist political agenda as a symptom of
women’s global oppression under patriarchy. Berry’s initial project was to analyze crossborder trafficking, but expanded to encompass a variety of activities within the commercial
sex industry:
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I soon realized that my assumption that traffic in women and children was different
from street prostitution was invalid. From interviews and other research I learned that
virtually the only distinction that can be made between traffic in women and street
prostitution is that the former involved crossing international borders. The practices
used to force women into prostitution are the same whether they are trafficked across
international boundaries or from one part of a city to another...Female sexual slavery
then refers to international traffic in women and forced street prostitution taken
together. (Berry, 6)
In Berry’s argument, female sexual slavery encompasses a scope of economic exchanges that
result, in her estimation, in the oppression of women predicated by the male “demand” for
sex. Throughout Female Sexual Slavery, Berry depicts trafficking as the symptom of a global
slave market for women’s flesh, in graphic and emotive language (although there is a distinct
lack of first-person accounts of the phenomenon Berry describes). The answer is a call to
“abolish” sexual slavery—through the abolition of the context in which slavery takes place,
the global market for sex.
Since the 1980’s, abolitionist feminists have founded a variety of antitrafficking organizations. In 1988, Berry helped to found the Coalition Against Trafficking in
Women (CATW), an organization with the express purpose of not only ending sex
trafficking, but all commercial sexual exploitation through the recognition of prostitution as
violence against women (catwinternational.org). For CATW, the violence experienced by
prostitutes and the trafficking of women for sex implicates the commercial sex industry as a
tool for women’s subjugation. According to Dorchen Leidholdt, a current CATW board
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member, “when we bring our knowledge about violence against women and girls to an
analysis of the global sex industry, what we see is not labor or work, but an institution of
male dominance at its most virulent, a system of power and control that keeps women and
girls inside it in conditions of perennial gang rape” (Leinholdt qtd. in Kempadoo 2001, 35).
The sex industry is seen as the main site where trafficking occurs, as an economy of
abuse and coercion that runs on the sexual demands of the patriarchy. Consent to prostitution
is therefore rendered impossible, since contractual agreements that take place within an
oppressive system that demands sex can not be considered fully consensual. Kathy Miriam
argues that rather than robbing women of agency, the abolitionist problematization of consent
instead questions the demand for sexual services that creates the sex industry in the first
place:
The root question of an abolitionist approach to prostitution is not whether women
‘choose’ prostitution or not, but why men have the right to demand that women’s
bodies are sold as commodities in the capitalist market. The central premise of the
abolitionist approach is that, ‘men create the demand; women are the supply. (2)
Abolitionist feminists argue that the exchange of money for sex is the epitome of
commodification of the female body, and that “the category of ‘sex work’ depends on a
contractual model of agency and its central notion of the proprietary self, and thus a model
that both presupposes and conceals the social relations of domination that obtain for
prostitution” (Miriam, 5). The sex industry is not an industry like any other, but an
economization of rape mediated by the exchange of money rooted in men’s entitlement to
sexual access to women.
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However, abolitionist feminists do not go unopposed within the feminist movement.
The burgeoning sex workers’ rights movement holds a diametrically opposed understanding
of the sex industry, drawing on both liberal feminist critiques and the growing multitude of
political sex workers to argue that sex work is no different from any other kind of labor. This
reading of the sex industry emerged from “community organizing, research, and policy
advocacy advanced by sex workers themselves, who define their work in prostitution, porn,
stripping, BDSM, and other forms of sexual entertainment and fantasy as real work” (Gira
Grant, 4). n comparison with abolitionism, the sex work position was primarily concerned
with supporting women’s (and increasingly, men’s) autonomy and agency, supporting their
choice to enter the sex industry. However, this understanding of sex work as synonymous
with any other kind of labor was rooted in a liberal politics of free choice: “liberalism is
centrally concerned with the idea of ‘choice,’ and construes ‘choice’ as the exercise of the
individual’s autonomous will” (Miriam, 2). This emphasis on choice was largely a response
to “the neo-abolitionist feminists’ assignment of a ‘false consciousness’ to those who claim
the voluntarily engage in prostitution” (Chuang, 1670). While anti-trafficking organizations
that embrace people’s right to choose sex work are few, one relatively large organization that
takes this tack is the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women.
However, the “liberal choice” model of sex work is not without problems.
Particularly as anti-trafficking organizations gained momentum, sex workers and sex work
advocates were forced to differentiate between sex work and sex trafficking “as part of a
necessary defensive reaction to the feminist allegation that all prostitution was violence
against women” (Doezema 2004, 70). Drawing on liberal politics’ emphasis on individual
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liberty an choice, embraced a dichotomous understanding of “forced” sex work and “chosen”
sex work. Jo Doezema argues that the acceptance of the “force/choice” dichotomy by sex
work advocates was largely a strategic response to liberal trends in global politics:
Liberalism’s legacy for feminism is global: as the notion of human rights has
expanded and become a legitimate and powerful arena to argue for liberatory ideals
around gender, sexuality, and a host of other concerns, global feminism has been
highly influenced by liberal arguments, as these fit into a human rights framework.
(2004, 69)
While this strategy may have been politically necessary for sex workers’ rights, the
acceptance of the force/choice dichotomy “was not a rejection of the feminist conception of
prostitution but a refinement of it” (Doezema 2004, 70-1). Accepting that some sex workers
are trafficked and coerced reiterated abolitionist assumptions about violence and the sex
industry, rather than negating them. The emphasis on “choice” also de-emphasizes the
contexts of structural inequality in which choices are made, and “the ‘sex work’ model of
agency occludes the reality that it is men’s demand that makes prostitution intelligible and
legitimate as a means of survival for women in the first place” (Miriam, 9).
The voluntary/forced dichotomy “creates false divisions between sex workers” that
ignore the wide range of intersection forms of coercion that might limit the choices that sex
workers have within the sex industry (Doezema 1998, 42). Situating the sex worker as an
autonomous human subject who deserves protection of their rights has necessitated the
creation of the counter point, of the trafficked woman whose rights are secondary to her
rescue. Moreover, this distinction is frequently drawn along racial lines, in which “the
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‘voluntary’ prostitute is a Western sex worker, seen as capable of making independent
decisions about whether or not to sell sexual services, while the sex worker from a
developing country is deemed unable to make this same choice: she is passive, naive, and
ready prey for traffickers” since, in anti-trafficking rhetoric, poverty itself constitutes a kind
of force (Doezema 1998, 42). In many ways, the reliance of the liberal feminist
understanding of sex work on the notion of choice limits its ability to describe the range of
sex workers’ experiences and is complicit in the creation of global class hierarchies. By
accepting that prostitution can be forced and that any woman from a poor nation must be a
forced prostitute by the nature of her poverty, liberal feminist understandings of sex work
have set up a model in which the choice of women from developing countries is ignored: her
coercion is a foregone conclusion.
The last and possibly most powerful players in the anti-trafficking movement are
faith-based aid organizations. The rise of the importance of trafficking in the 1990’s offered
aid organizations a major opportunity to influence policy and discourse as they defined
modern responses to trafficking. In the 1990’s, faith-based organizations made a concerted
effort to move towards “‘common denominator’ concerns such as global warming, prison
reform, human trafficking, and HIV/AIDS” (Bernstein, 136). The increase in the importance
of faith-based lobbies in political dialogue as a result of this move was so significant that
some critics have read the shift in evangelical politics as “a self-conscious effort to expand
their base and political power through the vehicle of human rights” (Soderlund, 68). Some of
the major faith-based NGO’s that have formed around this imperative are the International
Justice Mission (IJM), Shared Hope International,
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In her ethnographic study of the convergence of evangelical organizations on the
issue of trafficking, sociologist Elisabeth Bernstein argues that rather than reflecting an
increased liberalism in evangelical politics, the faith-based response to trafficking is actually
a reflection of conservative reactions to modern concerns. Bernstein argues that “Christian
campaigns against ‘modern-day slavery’” can be read as “a reaction as much against ‘the
modern’ as against slavery” (Bernstein, 135). For faith-based NGOs, fighting trafficking is
the perpetration of “a sexual politics premised upon the reinstatement
of traditional sex and gender roles underlies the attention that many conservative
Christians have granted to the issue” (Bernstein, 133). If “sexual slavery” is, as many claim,
“the dark side of globalization” then the logical remedy would be the proliferation of
traditional values and religious ethics. The embeddedness of missionism in the is reflected in
the common practice of conversion as a form of “aid” that faith-based organizations give to
sex workers that they “rescue” from brothels. Using humanitarian agendas to propagate faith,
these organizations are concerned as much with moral reform and envangelism as the wellbeing of others—for faith-based NGOs, salvation is the central goal.
Each of these three groups have played a role in shaping the framing of trafficking;
qualifying who the term applies to, how it can be understood, where it emanates from, and
what can be done about it. However, feminist abolitionists and evangelist groups have largely
captured both the political momentum and national attention for their narratives about
trafficking. As a result, sex workers’ rights voices have played a marginal role in shaping
responses to trafficking—the emphasis that most anti-trafficking advocates place on the evils
of the sex industry have made anti-trafficking work a hostile sphere for sex workers’ rights
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organizations. In the context of the fervor around trafficking, many sex workers rights’
organizations have distanced themselves from debates about framing, realizing that “the best
way of protecting sex worker rights in the debate on defining trafficking was through making
sex workers invisible” (Doezema 2004, 78). As a result, anti-sex work perspectives have
dominated the debate, and the exclusion of sex workers (especially non-white, non-Western
sex workers who fall outside the model of the “liberated” sex worker) has resulted in a
silencing of alternative readings of sex as labor. In this environment “the migrant woman sex
worker becomes the ground for competing claims and theories, silenced by not only the
master narratives but also the Western gaze” (Kempadoo, 2012, ix).
In this thesis, I will trace the embeddedness of anti-migrant, anti-prostitution
ideologies in the political response to trafficking, and the real, human costs that these policies
have elicited both domestically and abroad. By re-situating trafficking policy in its political
context and in its lived effects on the target populations of the anti-trafficking movement, I
will construct the imperative for an alternative to the trafficking framework. I argue that the
injustices created by the mainstream response to trafficking are not, as some critics argue, the
result of the “ideological capture” of trafficking by social actors with hidden political
agendas, but are ideologically embedded in the construction of “trafficking” as a particular
kind of labor abuse (Chuang). By reinforcing divisions between “forced” or “enslaved” and
“free,” between sex work and other kinds of labor, between gender and autonomy, and
between those who benefit from the inclusion within nation-state and those who are “crossed
by borders,” the trafficking framework ultimately serves hegemonic orders rather than the
needs of oppressed, exploited, and abused people. As an instrument for human rights, the
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anti-trafficking movement is bankrupt—at best, it is useless and disynchronous with lived
experience, at worst it can be experienced as a perpetuation of structural violence. However,
as a social construction that justifies nationalistic policy responses, a vilification of global
movement, invasive and neocolonialist interventions in overseas policy, and the moral
agency of activists intent on rescue, anti-trafficking thrives.
In Chapter 1, I will discuss the transformation of ideology into policy both at an
international level, and in the United States. Highlighting the influence of abolitionist/
evangelisgt coalitions in creating a definition of trafficking that serves particular policy aims,
I will demonstrate how policy makers were able to embed political agendas underneath the
“apolitical” issue of trafficking through the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. I will then
discuss how, through the various Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Acts,
shifting concerns about national security and increasingly conservative approaches to the sex
industry were embedded into anti-trafficking legislation.
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the domestic enforcement of the Trafficking Victim’s
Protection Act through border control, hyper-visibility of migrant communities, victimidentification and “protection,” and the prosecution of both the sex sector and migrant
communities under anti-trafficking mandates. I will argue that national security and
citizenship concerns—not human rights— motivate the criminal justice-driven response to
trafficking. I will then discuss how the response fails to meet the real rights needs of
migrants, ignoring the underlying motivations for migration and even directly counteracting
the strategies for social and economic mobility that migrants enact in situations of crossborder labor.
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In Chapter 3, I will take up the global enforcement of U.S. Anti-trafficking standards
and how capitulation to the policy agendas of the United States is exacted through the annual
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. I will demonstrate how through rankings, policy
prescriptions, and sanctions trafficking is leveraged for political ends that have less to do
with human rights than the national interest of the United States. I will also address the
failure of the TIP Report to address the global policies that truly motivate the abuse and
exploitation of migrants by perpetrating global inequalities that drive people across borders. I
will then discuss how the particular how targeting of women as potential victims of
trafficking and delimiting their migration ignores the growing impetus for women to move
around the globe, and actually increasing their risk of exploitation.
In Chapter 4, I will analyze the troubling coalition between NGOs and the State
through the government-subsidized global “Rescue Industry” (Agustín). Focusing on case
studies where rescue is experienced as structural violence by targeted populations, I will
demonstrate the contradictions between the narratives put forward by anti-trafficking
activists and the women they constructively identify as “victims.” I will then discuss the links
between neoliberal ideology and the rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, arguing that
rescue frequently amounts to little more than integration into the global economy that
produces the economic disparities that drive people into “trafficked” situations.
The reinforcement of global hierarchies of gender, class, and race that these policy
implementations reflect create a pressing need for an alternative to the trafficking paradigm,
which has become little more than excuse to inflict structural violence on the populations
characterized as the source of the trafficking problem. To create this alternative, we must
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rigorously interrogate not the lived repercussions of anti-trafficking, but the assumptions that
underpin its creation as a framework to understand human rights abuses that lie at the
confluence of gender, race, and globalization. In other words, to take up Johan Lindquist’s
call to action, we need to move “beyond accepting the term trafficking as an empirical
problem and starting point. Instead, we need to consider how ‘trafficking’ has emerged as a
transnational phenomenon in socio-historical terms” (Lindquist, 322). Only then can the
possibility of real justice for the oppressed and abused workers tossed about by global labor
markets be addressed.

18

Chapter 1
Policy Formation and Anti-trafficking Agendas
We’ve got a problem, and we need to do something about it.
-President George W. Bush, 2004 address to the National Training Conference on Human
Trafficking
In the new millennium, trafficking took on a renewed importance as an international
moral issue, as international regulations and national policies reflected the imperative to deal
with this “modern form of slavery.” In the global arena, anti-trafficking activists mobilized
both national power and international human rights dialogues to create an internationally
applicable definition of trafficking. The resulting ruling, the United Nations’ Optional
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children (commonly called the Palermo Protocol) which outlined the goals and minimum
standards that participant nations should take to combat trafficking. However, this definition
was rendered essentially meaningless by the competing interests of activists and nations. Not
only was the United Nations powerless to enforce its own legislation, but the definition was
so vague that it essentially left a vacuum for national policies (with their own agendas) to fill.
After the Palermo Protocol was formed, it became clear that the United Nations had
done little more than create a shield of “human rights” for nationalistic policies. The earliest
and most internationally potent of these policies was the anti-trafficking legislation passed in
the United States: the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, commonly abbreviated as
the TVPA. While the dialogue around the TVPA made it seem a necessary response to
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(overstated) claims about the scale and nature of trafficking, the legislation was formed in the
context of powerful bipartisan coalitions that sought to embed abolitionist assumptions and
agendas within the United States’ response to trafficking.
In the context of regime change after the 2000 election of President Bush, these
claims became more blatant: through the TVPA, trafficking became a way to re-codify fears
about sexual morality and global immigration in the context of the War on Terror. Like to its
counterpart, the War on Trafficking was rendered as a moral fight against the constructed,
stateless global evil of “trafficking,” but in reality mobilized to serve nationalistic ends. In
this chapter I will demonstrate that, through the construction of the TVPA, policies that
ostensibly had little to do with rights were contextualized within a rights framework and
given energy by the moral call to “do something” about trafficking. I will trace the political
coalitions that formed between the far left and the far right that created an imperative to
embrace a definition of trafficking that located the sex industry as a site of “modern day
slavery,” both at the international level but particularly through the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act. I will detail how mandates for protection were curbed by fears about “floods”
of immigrants abusing trafficking protections, fears that ultimately proved unfounded.
Through this discussion I will argue that the anti-trafficking movement has been an
accomplice to anti-prostitution and anti-migrant agendas, politically utilized as an
“apolitical” moral shield for dubious agendas.
Problematizing Trafficking
As anti-trafficking advocates gained momentum near the end of the millennium, antitrafficking activists began to mobilize around the need for an international definition of
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trafficking, and a set of global rules about how to combat it. Formally separating trafficking
as a particular kind of crime was necessary to justify the political lens of anti-trafficking
activists, who saw trafficking as distinct violation of rights that was separate from or even
beyond gender violence, migrant exploitation, and violation of laborer’s rights. There was a
need to clearly define who was a victim of trafficking and who was not, a need made even
more clear by the intersecting rights claims of “trafficked victims:”
The imperative of adequately and indubitably identifying ‘genuine’ victims of
trafficking is derived from the ambivalent relationship that human trafficking has to
other social problems. Victims of trafficking are and are not illegal migrants. They are
and are not prostitutes...the classification as victims simultaneously closes down and
opens up specific possibilities of action. (Aradau, 6)
Control over definition was therefore a primary concern and site of immense opportunity for
anti-trafficking activists with various political agendas, and nation-states with agendas of
their own. In response to the imperative set forward by these activists to create new
trafficking policies, the United Nations began drafting a new trafficking protocol, opening
the opportunity for political agenda-setters to codify their positions into law. Abolitionist
advocates in particular pushed for the inclusion of prostitution in the United Nations’
definition, as they wished the definition to reflect their claims that the sex industry was a
major site of trafficking of women. They leveraged their power within their own national
arena, lobbying U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright “to push for tougher antiprostitution language in the protocol. These groups even buttonholed a few members of
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congress, complaining that the American negotiators were too lenient and were actually
supporting prostitution” (DeStefano, 25).
Initial drafts of the protocol generated some serious concerns about the potential
human rights violations implicit in several of the protocol’s articles. National interest
foregrounded many member country’s willingness to sign an an international protocol, and as
a result they advocated for responses to trafficking that served those interests: “because, to a
large degree, trafficking involved immigration crimes, the draft protocol contained a number
of articles dealing with law enforcement measures designed to thwart illegal
migration” (DeStefano, 22). The then-High Comissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson
issued an informal note to the delegation regarding some concerns with the draft, including
the failure of the document to address that migrants “precarious situation in society often
leads to violation of their most basic human rights” and include a migrants’ rights clause, the
“implementation difficulties inherently associated with undefined, imprecise and emotive
terms such as ‘sexual exploitation’ when used in connection with adults,” and the use of the
term “rehabilitation” in reference to victims, a term that “is generally reserved for
offenders” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 1999).
Robinson recommended provisions that would guarantee permanent asylum for migrants
seeking protection under the protocol, and prevent countries from creating immigration
policies that would have “discriminatory effects or infringe upon the right of an individual to
leave her or his country or legally migrate to another” (Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights 1999). These recommendations were not included in the
final draft of the Protocol.
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The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children was ratified by 159 states in 2000. In the United Nations’ new protocol,
trafficking was defined as a discrete kind of offense through the use of “force, fraud, and
coercion”:
Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring
or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs...The
consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation...shall be
irrelevant...where any of the means set forth...have been used...The recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall be considered “trafficking in persons.”
(United Nations 2000, Annex 2, Section I, Article 3).
This definition is at once troublingly vague and problematically specific. On one hand, what
is meant by “vulnerability” or “coercion” is unclear. Particularly since the consent of the
victim to “trafficking” is rendered meaningless; in this definition, trafficking covers a broad
variety of offenses: “by making the consent of the migrant in her/his movement across
borders ‘irrelevant’ if they experience any form of deception, coercion, or abuse in the
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process, this definition dramatically expands the scope of trafficking” (Sharma, 90).
Abolitionist activist Janice Raymond of the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
applauded the broad scope of a definition of trafficking that does not take into account the
consent of the victim. “Only this kind of principled and inclusive definition of trafficking
would take the burden of proof off the exploited and place it on the exploiters,” writes
Raymond, arguing that this kind of definition would “make no distinction between deserving
and undeserving victims of trafficking—those who can prove they were forced and those
who cannot” (494).
However, other critics have noted how the irrelevancy of consent in the Protocol
reflects abolitionist goals to include all sex workers in the category of “victims of trafficking”
and neutralize the agency of women who enter sex work: “as the space for consent dwindles
to nothing, the myth of trafficking grows to encompass all prostitution” (Doezema 2004, 74).
Many sex workers actually avoided engaging in the debates that resulted in the protocol’s
formation, realizing that “when ‘trafficking’ is a target, prostitutes will also become a
target” (Leigh qtd. in Doezema 2004, 76). In the broad definition of consent put forward by
the protocol, the sex industry is characterized a specific target for anti-trafficking action. Sex
workers’ networks had already engaged in international advocacy surrounding trafficking,
and one project issued a report to the United Nations “which examined how a range of
human rights abuses in sex work, including those referred to under ‘trafficking’, would be
covered if existing international law was applied to sex workers” (Doezema 2004, 76).
Ultimately, however, the emotional appeals of anti-trafficking activists made the international
arena increasingly hostile to pro-sex work approaches to trafficking. As a result, sex workers
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increasingly withdrew from international trafficking debates, realizing that “the best way of
protecting sex worker rights in the debate on defining trafficking was through making sex
workers invisible,” and that any mention of prostitution in the Protocol would likely single
out the sex industry as a particular site of scrutiny (Doezema 2004, 78). Their concerns were
ultimately overridden by the strong political pressure to link trafficking and prostitution that
abolitionists were placing on the United Nations and its member states.
The messy and over-broad nature of the Palermo Protocol’s definition has thus lead
some critics to conclude that the Protocol “is not a human rights instrument. It is an
instrument designed to facilitate cooperation between states to combat organised crime,
rather than to protect or give restitution to the victims of the crime...Border controls and
police cooperation, not human rights protection, lies at the heart of [the trafficking
protocol]” (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 136). By offering little in the way of guaranteed
protection for victims and promoting the legal enforcement of borderlines, the Protocol is
primarily a litigative instrument designed to facilitate international cooperation in criminal
prosecution of trafficking as the primary mode of giving “justice” to the trafficked.
Enforcement of the Protocol falls under the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and
explicitly compels the signing countries to “adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this
Protocol” (United Nations, Annex II, Section I, Article 5). The Protocol thus prioritizes a
criminal response; although “trafficking, and the rights of persons who have faced abuse
within forced labor or migration, is a human rights issue” in the foremost international
standard, trafficking “has fallen under the umbrella of crime” (Mahdavi, 15)
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However, the Protocol fulfilled the need of anti-trafficking activists to have
trafficking acknowledged as a discrete problem, and given an operable international
definition. The Palermo Protocol, even if it offered little in the way of protection for victims
offered much in the way of political legitimacy for the trafficking framework. The debates
around and eventual ratification of the Protocol provided a springboard for anti-trafficking
activists to enact anti-trafficking policies on the national level. During the debates around the
Palermo Protocol, similar debates were occurring in the United States to solidify the
American response to human trafficking. The vagueness in the Palermo Protocol made it
clear that the strongest trafficking legislation would be formed at the national level, and it
was in this arena that anti-trafficking activists redoubled their efforts. In the context of
American politics, this ripe political opportunity for change resulted in a unique coalition
between two anti-trafficking factions that shared little common ground. This union between
evangelist christians and radical feminists ultimately resulted in what Janie Chuang has
characterized as an “ideological capture” of trafficking debates. These two disparate parties
joined forces to normalize shared assumptions about the magnitude, nature, and necessary
response to trafficking through policy, embedding these assumptions in the definitions and
power of the TVPA.
Embedded Ideologies in Trafficking Victims Protection Act
In the new wave of international interest in abating the “modern slave trade,” the
United States was among the first to ratify legislation that specifically dealt with human
trafficking. Policy initiatives in Congress occurred simultaneously with debates around the
Palermo Protocol, and the first potential anti-trafficking legislation appeared before the
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Senate in 1999. Sponsored by Senator Paul Wellstone (Democrat, Indiana) with the support
of the Clinton administration, this bill “understood sex trafficking as one of many forms of
coerced labor” and also “conceived of prostitution as a form of labor whose characteristics
were linked to the conditions under which it was performed” (Soderlund, 73). Displeased
with the “pro-prostitution” stance of the bill, Representative Chris Smith (Republican, New
Jersey) introduced a second piece of legislation, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA). Smith had no previous record as an advocate for women and immigrants, following
the conservative party line on immigration policy, welfare cutbacks, and the opposition of
reproductive rights and family planning efforts. However, through anti-trafficking
Representative Smith was recast as a champion for women’s and migrant’s rights. The
TVPA, constructed with the assistance of Gary Haugen of the faith-based International
Justice Mission and feminist Laura Lederer of the Protection Project, garnered significant
support in the Republican-led House of Representatives. Forced to abandon his bill,
Wellstone was able to amend the TVPA in the Senate. The act was re-packaged with the
Violence Against Women Act, and together they became the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act. The bill ultimately passed 371/1 in the House and 95/0 in the Senate
in July of 2000, months before the ratification of the Palermo Protocol.
The passage of the TVPA with such an overwhelming majority “made it clear that
human trafficking was now on the government’s radar and could garner, when the time came,
considerable political consensus” (DeStefano, 15). The emergence of trafficking as a
nonpartisan issue was largely thanks to the active participation of anti-trafficking interest
groups in the formation of the bill. In the United States, the mutual interest in including
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abolitionist attitudes in legislation led faith-based anti-trafficking organizations and radical
feminists to form a powerful alliance. This “left/right coalition” was able to, as one key
policy player put it “capture the soft middle” (Footen Bromfield, 254). Anti-trafficking
activists who took a more liberal stance towards sex work found their voices drowned out as
the coalition between radical feminists and conservative evangelists dominated discussion
and promoted their common definition of trafficking that rooted the problem in the sex
industry. One activist said that the discussion on trafficking “became forced prostitution very
quickly” as “the conservative portion of the Republican party was beginning to increasingly
dominate mainstream human rights issues that the liberals, Democrats, and moderates had
generally stewarded” (Footen Bromfield, 250). The alliance of conservative and radical
feminist groups on the issue of trafficking gave them the power to “ideologically capture” the
trafficking debate for their own political and moral ends (Chuang, 2010). This coalition made
feminists uncomfortable but effective allies:
Feminist and faith-based groups find themselves arguing for similar moral
imperatives, even when their value judgements are not totally aligned. Where faithbased groups focus on the harms of sex outside marriage, monogamy and family, for
example, the radical feminists refer to the performative harm of men using women’s
bodies for sex. Both claims, however, seem to be grounded in a moral imperative
about acceptable sex, making them awkward but definite bedfellows.
(O’Brien et. al., 33)
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Through their union, abolitionist feminists and abolitionist evangelical NGOs were able to
summarily exclude alternative arguments about the nature and framing of the trafficking
problem, particularly those that characterized prostitution as labor.
The charged rhetoric that motivated the passage of the TVPA focused on the
propagation of a particular narrative of victimization that mandated a decisive response:
“Congressional testimony in the lead-up to the TVPA played on the imagery of women and
children forced into literal sexual slavery, utilizing graphic images of women and girls locked
in trailers, raped, and deprived of food” (Chuang, 1695). Victims who fit this narrative were
found and paraded before Congress, or their stories were recycled through the mouths of
abolitionist advocates. Tellingly, “none of the 43 individuals who gave testimony at the
[TVPA] hearings provided evidence as sex workers or as a representative of a sex workers’
organization” (O’Brien et al, 48). Instead, advocates focused on portraying the sex industry
as universally evil and entirely dependent on trafficking to sustain itself. Since the data didn’t
exist to support these claims, advocates turned their to political allies to legitimize this
narrative. In the coming years, the Department of Justice would fund reports such as the 2001
report “Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States” by CATW chairs Janice Raymond
and Donna Hughes. The report made sweeping statistical generalizations about the
prevalence of violence and trafficking in the United States’ commercial sex industry based on
interviews with 40 women who had worked in the sex industry (Hughes and Raymond). This
research, although motivated by the need of abolitionists to perpetuate their claims about the
nature of trafficking and in particular, their claims about the prevalence of sex trafficking,
became enmeshed into policy. This ideologically driven information-gathering and
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abolitionist lens was written into the language of the bill and permanently enmeshed in
policy.
Contained in the introduction of the TVPA are two statistics: first, the bill finds that
“At least 700,000 persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within or
across international borders” and that “approximately 50,000 women and children are
trafficked into the United States each year” (H.R. 3244, Sec. 102[b]1). In reality, “the 50,000
figure actually encompassed trafficking of men, women, and children into the United States
for sweatshop labor, domestic work, and agricultural labor (and was downgraded in 2003 to a
figure of 18,000-20,000)” (Chuang, 1695). By 2004 the “at least 700,000 annually” figure,
which had already fallen from the supposed millions of people trafficked each year, had
fallen to 600,000-800,000 per year (U.S. Department of State, 2004 Trafficking in Persons
Report, 6). However, in 2006 the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report
casting doubt on this estimate due to the questionable tactics that went into the creation of
this estimate, lack of any documentation about how it was reached, and the “considerable
discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims” (Government
Accountability Office, 2). The TVPA places emphasis on the sex industry as the primary site
of trafficking, although information gathered by the International Labor Organization
indicates that approximately 22% of people living under conditions of forced labor are
victims of sexual exploitation, compared with 68% that are living under forced labor
exploitation in “industries such as agriculture, construction, domestic work and
manufacturing” (ILO 2012, 13). Additionally, the TVPA’s assertion that “traffickers
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primarily target women and girls” is belied by the ILO’s estimate that women and girls make
up 55% of forced labor victims—a majority, but not an overwhelming one (ILO 2012, 14).
It is not then surprising, given the misinformation that is literally written into the Act,
that the definition of trafficking put forward by the TVPA places an emphasis on sex
trafficking as a particularly common and egregious kind of defense. The TVPA defines two
classes of victims, as either victims of “sex trafficking,” by which is meant “the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial
sex act” (H.R. 3244, sec. 103[9]) or as victims of “severe forms of trafficking in persons”:
The term “severe forms of trafficking in persons” means A) sex trafficking in which a
commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or B) the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services,
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. (H.R. 3244, sec.103[8])
A victim of sex trafficking can therefore include anyone who has ever received any
assistance or shelter while working in prostitution, and those who are complicit in their
trafficking are pimps, madames, agents, brothel-keepers, and a wide swath of other people
who work in the sex industry. However, the victim of trafficking is not subject to any
particular protection, the main purpose of her inclusion is the prosecution of her traffickers.
Instead, it is the “victim of severe trafficking” who receives the bulk of protection under the
TVPA. Her protection is a matter of more concern, and the majority of protections offered in
the TVPA are only for the person who has been “severely” trafficked. Victim-creation in the
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TVPA thus works to “constrict the ways victimhood can be imagined; for instance, sex
trafficking victims must be distinguishable from illegal aliens or prostitutes, whose assumed
consent writes them as criminals and not victims” (Hua, xv). By identifying victims, the
TVPA therefore creates an “exemption” to criminality for those who fit particular definitions
of victimhood, offering protection rather than the prosecution they would otherwise face.
The focus on sex trafficking shows the influence of abolitionist rhetoric on the TVPA.
Adding an explicit definition of sex trafficking as separate from other kinds of trafficking
reflects the abolitionist “value judgement...that trafficking for sexual exploitation is distinct
from trafficking for other forms of forced labour, and therefore needs to be addressed
separately” (O’Brien et al., 29). In accordance with the necessary nuance that abolitionists
use in the promotion of their attitudes towards the sex industry, “this does not necessarily
imply a condemnation of legalized prostitution; however, the uniqueness of sex trafficking is
justified through arguments that the sex industry is not a normal or legitimate
industry” (O’Brien et. al. 29). Additionally, the focus on sex trafficking “reinforces the notion
that migrant abuse is largely a problem of the sexual violation of women and
children” (Chapkis 927). Gendered narratives about forced prostitution are implicit in the
wording of the TVPA, reflecting the power of ideological groups in the policy’s formation.
However, the distinction between trafficked and non-trafficked “labor and services” is
equally as important as the distinction between sexual victimization and “normal”
victimization, although the emphasis on sex trafficking down-plays the larger problem of
non-sex sector labor exploitation. Trafficked labor is defined be the presence of “force, fraud,
and coercion” that supposedly does not exist in a contractual labor situation. “A key problem
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here arises from what is actually meant by ‘force’,” argue Anderson and Andrijasevic, “how
to distinguish trafficking from legally tolerated employment contracts?” (141). “Force, fraud,
and coercion” lies at the heart of the differentiation between freely contracted labor and a
trafficking offense, and in the simplistic narratives that provided the emotional motivation for
the TVPA, the evidence of force, fraud, and coercion was clear (or at least presented to be
so). However, beyond the Manichean narrative of “ideal” and unambiguous victimization,
the distinction between forced and free, fraudulent and authentic, or coerced and chosen may
not be so clear. When the minimum wage is not a livable wage, when welfare programs
partner with employers to force welfare recipients to accept bottom-rung jobs or lose their
benefits, when prisons contract with private firms to provide cheap labor at bottom dollar, a
distinction between trafficked labor and tolerated labor exploitation seems little more than an
arbitrary division of convenience. “Violence, confinement, coercion, deception and
exploitation can and do occur within both legally regulated and irregular systems of work,
and within legal and illegal systems of migration,” yet by distinguishing between the market
for free labor and the market for forced labor, the TVPA draws a line where a scale of
coercion exists, neatly concealing legitimized labor exploitation under the guise of action
against trafficking (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 141).
The law “[addresses] the reality that trafficking is not primarily a problem of forced
migration of unwilling women but rather of economic desperation” and offers a variety of
“economic alternatives to prevent and deter trafficking” (Chapkis, 933; H.R. 3244, sec. 106
[a]). Proposed programs include microcredit lending programs, “programs to promote
women’s participation in economic decision making,” programs to promote girls education,
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“development of educational curricula regarding the dangers of trafficking” and “grants to
nongovernmental organizations to accelerate and advance the political, economic, social, and
educational roles and capacities of women in their countries” (TVPA 200, sec. 106 [a]
1-5).the TVPA mandates the identification and protection of victims of trafficking. Most
importantly, the TVPA exempts victims of trafficking from prosecution for crimes related to
their trafficking and offers them health services, shelter, and immigration assistance. The
major legal protection offered to victims of severe trafficking is the “T-Visa.” The T-Visa is a
special class of visa that allows identified victims of “severe forms” of trafficking to remain
in the United States for as long as they are useful to the investigation and prosecution of their
traffickers. During the debates around the TVPA, a major issue of contention was how many
T-Visas could be given out per year. Republicans were concerned that the T-Visa would
become a way for illegal immigrants to gain legal status in droves, by claiming to be victims
of trafficking:
Amendments restricting eligibility of victims to only the most severely abused and
the most purely innocent were put forward by anti-immigrant representatives such as
Lamar Smith from Texas. Smith justified the restrictions on the grounds that they
would ‘prevent hundreds of thousands of people claiming to be trafficking victims ...
[leading] to a massive amnesty for illegal aliens’” ( qtd. in Chapkis, 929).
Conversely, Democrats with more liberal stances on immigration were concerned about
putting a cap on T-Visas given the belief that 50,000 people were trafficked into the United
States each year. After much debate, a 5,000-per-year cap was set on the issue of T-Visas,
with an option to readdress the cap if more T-Visas proved to be necessary.
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Regime Change and the Reauthorization Acts
Months after Clinton signed the TVPA in 2000, the United States elected a new
President who would eventually make trafficking a major issue of his administration.
President George W. Bush’s conservative politics and embrace of faith-based policy making
made more open abolitionist policy possible, “significantly [altering] the ‘political
opportunity structure’ for anti-prostitution forces, [and] providing a degree of access and
influence that had not existed since the Reagan administration” (Weitzer, 449). Additionally,
Bush’s open avowal of a Christian mission in his Presidency allowed faith-based groups
unprecedented influence in creating trafficking policy, and faith-based NGOs were integrated
into the Bush Administration’s anti-trafficking response structures. As a result, “legal
frameworks to combat trafficking have been redeployed in the context of regime change from
the Clinton to Bush administration” in a way that strongly favors not only abolitionist goals,
but discourses of national security and anti-globalization, anti-immigrant responses
(Soderlund, 66-7).
In the early months of the Bush Administration, trafficking was not a high-priority
issue and the administration was largely silent on the efforts it was taking to enforce the
newly-passed TVPA. However, after the 9/11 attacks, trafficking was catapulted alongside
terrorism as a central focus of Bush Era foreign policy. Global migration became an issue of
national security as fears about global terrorist networks made immigrants more than just an
economic threat, but a present physical danger. As Bush launched the War on Terror,
immigrant rights were superseded by security discourses and cracking down on immigration
became a primary safety tactic. Global movement was the new threat to American
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sovereignty: “The new War on Terror has created space for a more strident and alarming
response to the global movements of people, reducing it at times to nothing more than an evil
threat” (Kapur, 35).
Beliefs about the organized nature of trafficking circuits were incorrectly conflated
with global terrorists networks, and although there was no supporting data, the Bush
administration quickly jumped to the conclusion that trafficking was funding terrorism
(Mahdavi). According to an official in the newly-minted U.S. Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons, “it’s all part and parcel of the same thing, trafficking and terror” (qtd.
in author’s field notes, Mahdavi, 10). The belief that slavery and subjugation accompanied
terrorism was used as a moral front to justify aggressive action against supposedly “terrorist”
nations. The trafficking discourse “[contributed] to tropes about Muslim women and the need
to save or protect these women through any means necessary, thus legitimizing acts of
violence across the world” (Mahdavi, 18). In this way, “discourse and policies regarding
both the war on terror and the war on trafficking fuel and reproduce themselves, with policy
slippages between the two wars” (Mahdavi, 14). The Bush Administration’s emphasis on
surveillance, border control, and militaristic neocolonial intervention was justified by both
“wars,” pairing rights and security discourses in a deft political move.
The use of trafficking as a moral smoke-shield for the War on Terror was particularly
evident in Bush’s 2003 address to the United Nations, when he went before the UN for the
first time since launching the internationally opposed War on Iraq and circumventing the
UN’s judgement and authority. In the same speech, Bush justified the move on Iraq and
publicly spoke, for the first time, of his administration’s commitment to ending trafficking.
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Bush made no differentiation between trafficking and sex trafficking, launching almost
immediately into century-old rhetoric about the particular ignominy of this “old evil:”
There's a special evil in the abuse and exploitation of the most innocent and
vulnerable. The victims of sex trade see little of life before they see the very worst of
life -- an underground of brutality and lonely fear. Those who create these victims and
profit from their suffering must be severely punished. Those who patronize this
industry debase themselves and deepen the misery of others. And governments that
tolerate this trade are tolerating a form of slavery. (CNN)
President Bush’s appeal to extreme youth of “the victims of the sex trade” was a narrative
over a century old. His “oratory was laden with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century antiprostitution rhetoric,” using an appeal to good and evil that mirrored the epic story-telling
emanating from the White Slave panic a century before (Soderlund, 77) Fed by an
increasingly polarized and sensationalist media, “an amplified mood of public sentimentality
on the part of U.S. audiences in the post-9/11 era guaranteed the domestic success of this
rhetoric” (Soderlund, 77). In a nation gripped by fear about the threats that globally mobile
Others presented to the homeland, anti-trafficking gained increased momentum not only as a
moral cause, but as a matter of protection.
The Bush Administrations acceptance of faith-motivated policy agendas also played
an important role in emphasizing anti-trafficking as an avenue of foreign policy. One of the
administration’s early appointments was the appointment of former Republican Congressman
John Miller as the Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking. John Miller was
already a favorite with faith-based groups, who actively lobbied for his appointment to the
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chair (Bumiller). Miller was unabashed about his opposition to the sex workers’ rights
framework, arguing that the very term “sex work” serves “to justify modern-day slavery,
[and] to dignify the perpetrators and the industries who enslave” (Miller qtd. in Bernstein,
130).
The integration of religiously-motivated abolitionist policies into the official antitrafficking approach of the United States was a godsend for faith-based groups. The
channeling of USAID money to faith-based organizations during the Bush Administration is
well documented, and one survey found “identified 159 faith-based organizations that
received more than $1.7 billion in USAID prime contracts, grants and agreements from fiscal
2001 to fiscal 2005” (Boston Globe). Trafficking was not exempt from this preference, and
“in 2003, [Attorney General John] Ashcroft allocated 91 million dollars in appropriations for
anti-trafficking initiatives while awarding million-dollar grants to evangelical groups like
Shared Hope International and International Justice Mission” (Report to Congress qtd. in
Soderlund, 76). The benefits of the institutionalization of abolitionist politics also refracted to
radical feminist organizations, as their input became increasingly important in policy circles.
Laura Lederer was given an official position in the administration as a Senior Advisor on
Trafficking in Persons to the Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs.
Additionally, Donna Hughes of CATW was called to testify before the Senate, where she
promoted the abolitionist agenda of ending projects that aimed to protect sex workers
through health measures such as condom distribution:
In some places, such as Thailand, aid programs claim that 100 percent condom use
policies has resulted in lowering the incidence of HIV, but it has come at the cost of
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overlooking and even excusing the sex slave trade in women and children. This
approach results in sacrificing the safety and freedom of women and children for the
good of public health. (U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations)
Feminist concerns about harm-reductionist projects were soon law, motivated by the
argument that harm-reduction was a form of acceptance. With the 2003 re-implementation of
the Mexico City Policy instituted under Reagan (more commonly known as the Global Gag
Ruling) President Bush effectively ended funding for sex work projects by cutting all aid to
organizations that provide condom distribution and family planning services. Although the
activities that the Global Gag Ruling banned “are all legal in the US; it [was] the Bush
administration’s position, however, that they must not be supported outside the US,
regardless of their proven effectiveness in saving lives or improving public health” (Ditmore
2012, 118).
These restrictions became permanently embedded in anti-trafficking legislation with
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003. Contained in the law were
increased border controls, measures to combat international sex tourism, but most
importantly a “limitation on the use of funds” that restricted funds appropriated under the
TVPA from going to any organization that would use them “to promote, support, or advocate
the legalization or practice of prostitution” (H.R. 2620, sec. 7[g]1). Additionally, no funds
were to be given to any organization “that has not stated in either a grant application, a grant
agreement, or both, that it does not promote, support, or advocate the legalization or practice
of prostitution” (H.R. 2620, Sec. 7[g]2). This section of the new legislation, authored by
Representative Smith, effectively required organizations that received USAID funding to
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make an “anti-prostitution pledge. Although Assistant Attorney General William Moschella
issued a letter to the Committee of the Judiciary containing concerns that the amendments in
the 2003 TVPRA constituted a free speech violation, his successor Daniel Levin withdrew
the concerns in 2004 (Moschella to Sensenbrenner, 2003; Waxman to Gonzales, 2005).
Through subsequent reauthorization acts, the TVPA was increasingly utilized to
perpetrate conservative policy agendas. The 2005 TVPRA contained language that
“established the crime of ‘domestic trafficking’ on a moral and legal par with previous crossborder understandings of the crime” (Bernstein, 142). More particularly, the 2005 TVPRA :
With the aim of shifting enforcement priorities toward the policing of street
prostitution in urban areas, the TVPRA established $5,000,000 in federal grants to
local law enforcement agencies to “investigate and prosecute acts of severe forms of
trafficking in persons [. . .] within

the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

(Bernstein, 142)
Significantly, the 2005 TVPRA included more of the sex industry under the jurisdiction of
trafficking than ever, allowing the Attorney General to use anti-trafficking funds “to
investigate and prosecute persons who engage in the purchase of commercial sex acts” and
“to educate persons charged with, or convicted of, purchasing or attempting to purchase
commercial sex acts” (H.R. 972, sec. 204[a]1.A and B). The bill also authorized antitrafficking appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security, fixing in law “the
interrelationship between trafficking in persons and terrorism, including the use of profits
from trafficking in persons to finance terrorism” (H.R. 972, Sec.104.c.4).
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Bernstein, through attendance at anti-trafficking police training sessions in New York
and Las Vegas, learned the implications of the TVPRA for law-enforcement:
Pimps can now be charged with the federal crime of sex trafficking and given upward
of ninety-nine-year prison sentences; prostitutes can be apprehended by law
enforcement as a means of securing their testimony in their “traffickers’ ”
prosecutions; and clients (whose “demand” for the services of prostitutes is declared
by TVPRA to be the underlying cause of trafficking) can be arrested and their cars
apprehended as a means of financing “antitrafficking” activities. (Bernstein, 143)
The modifications made to the TVPA in both 2003 and 2005 through the Reauthorization
acts indicated that under the Bush Presidency, the underlying abolitionist goal of combatting
the sex industry as part of the “War on Trafficking” was embedded into anti-trafficking
policy. However, the inherently anti-prostitution politics written into trafficking law has
received little to no attention: “the policy prescription that follows from the core assumption
of a link between prostitution and trafficking—that is, a focus on eradicating prostitution writ
large—has...gone largely unexamined by U.S. policymakers” (Chuang, 1723). By couching a
crackdown on the sex industry within the TVPA, lawmakers and influential parties have been
able to sidestep the democratic process, evading controversial debates about regulating the
sex industry through the moral imperative of anti-trafficking.
As national politics shifted away from conservativism resulting in the election of
President Barack Obama in 2008, the political consensus around anti-trafficking remained
the same. That same year, Congress reauthorized the TVPA with the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. The 2008 TVPRA expanded the
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programming of the TVPA to include partnerships to prevent the sale of “any item, product,
or material produced or extracted with the use of labor from victims of severe forms of
trafficking” (H.R. 7311, sec. 101 [2]A). Additionally, the legislation expanded the criminal
category of “perpetrator” of trafficking to all who knowingly benefit from participation in a
trafficking venture, and broadened the category to encompass fraudulent foreign labor
contracting (H.R. 7311, sec. 1593A; sec. 1351). By the time the 2013 TVPRA passed in
Congress with no changes made to the anti-prostitution pledge section of the law, the
inordinate focus on sex-trafficking as a particular category of concern (despite updated
information that this focus on sex-trafficking was not mandated by the data), and the false
dichotomies between “regular” exploitation and exploitation under trafficking; it had become
clear that on the issue of trafficking, the new administration would follow the footsteps of the
old.
What had changed, however, was the tactic for legitimizing legislation that only
thinly veiled political agendas unrelated to human rights concerns. Compared with President
Bush’s emotional appeal to universal moralism, President Obama’s anti-trafficking rhetoric
took a much more rational (and perhaps therefore more insidious) tack. Eschewing rhetoric
laden with religious ethics and the black-and-white language of “good and evil,” President
Obama has instead favored a logical presentation of trafficking as a disruption to the
American way of life. Presenting trafficking as an abuse of human rights that “tears at the
social fabric...distorts markets... [and] endangers public health and fuels violence and
organized crime,” Obama framed trafficking as more than a moral outrage, but a tangible
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threat to the benefits enjoyed by “free” world (U.S. Office of the Press Secretary). Fighting
trafficking is now not about morality, but about maintaining the status quo.
Over the course of a decade and a half, and three administrations, the trafficking
framework has become embedded in national policy as a useful vehicle for legitimizing antisex work agendas, panic about global migration, and the vast majority of labor exploitation
that occurs outside the limited purview of “trafficking.” The direct influence of abolitionist
agendas on policy, the use of the TVPA and the TVPRAs to serve anti-migrant and moralistic
agendas, and the simultaneous mobilization of trafficking and terrorism to not only justify
imperialist interventions but to foster fear about the threat that globalization presents to the
homeland suggest that “the ethical mandate to fight trafficking “is actually a form of antipolitics’: it smuggles politics in under a ‘humanitarian agenda’ seemingly geared towards the
assistance and protection of victims” (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 138). U.S. anti-trafficking
legislation is not, as anti-trafficking advocates and politicians would have us believe, a
fundamental change. Instead, the trafficking framework has simply been used to negatively
reinforce hegemonic structures of immigration, race, gender, and mobility as the norm.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Nationalism and Security in the Domestic Implementations of Antitrafficking Law
We didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us.
-Immigrant rights slogan
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and its subsequent reauthorizations
have demonstrated that, as framed in law, trafficking is little more than a container for
political agendas that vilify global migration and target the sex industry. As a result, while the
definition of trafficking allows for victimization outside of the context of migration and sex
work, in practice the anti-trafficking mandate of the TVPA has focused inordinately on
migrant sex workers. The focus on sex further conceals the abuse of laborers in regulated and
licit industries, leading to uneven enforcement of domestic laws for laborers outside of the
sex industry who face abuse: “What is called ‘trafficking’ when it involves sex is often
called ‘international labor migration’ when it involves other kinds of labor” (Chuang, 1704).
The widely non-controversial nature of trafficking as a political issue belies the work
that the TVPA does as a set of laws, regulations, and capabilities that are utilized against
marginalized communities. While presented as a human rights framework, trafficking
ultimately upholds the exclusionary politics that motivate trans-border migration and
subsequent exploitation. While it is evident in both critical circles and official dialogue that
trafficking is fueled by global migration circuits, policies focus primarily on barricading the
United States against traffickers and their victims rather than addressing the factors that draw
laborers en-masse into a vulnerable state of mobility: “most laws that target trafficking do not
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increase job opportunities at home but rather increase vulnerability of migration for who
choose illegal and unregulated means” (Mahdavi, 48). When enacted, anti-trafficking policies
enforce the nationalistic security and economic concerns of the United States, rather than
addressing the needs of vulnerable populations:
The Trafficking Victims' Protection Act helps to define "compassionate
conservatism": a willingness to provide assistance and protection for a few by
positioning them as exceptions, proving the need for punitive measures used against
the many. The law thus symbolically and legally separates trafficking victims from
economic migrants who are understood to have unfairly benefited from facilitated
migration. (Chapkis 930)
Trafficking, as a framework, is not about identifying and protecting victims while
prosecuting only the guilty. The rights of the populations that are rendered hyper-visible (and
therefore, more vulnerable under the trafficking framework) “remain to be taken up in a
systematic fashion within the dominant anti-trafficking discourse” (Sanghera, 9). In this
chapter, I will highlight case studies that demonstrate that within the United States, the
trafficking framework is utilized to enact anti-immigrant, racist, protectionist policies under
the guise of rights and justice. I will demonstrate that domestic anti-trafficking has
manifested as a restrictive regime of exclusion; closing legal pathways for migration, making
migrant populations and sex workers hyper-visible under the guise of victim identification,
and prosecuting those who anti-trafficking legislation was supposed to protect. Through this
case study I will argue that the lived reality of anti-trafficking enforcement suggests that
federal anti-trafficking efforts have amounted in practice to little more than thinly veiled
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persecution of marginal communities who challenge the sovereign interests of the nation,
rather than a protection of human rights. For vulnerable people, being brought under the antitrafficking apparatus does not signify an end to abuse, but is itself experienced as structural
violence.
Prevention at the border
Borders present an ideological problem—as a purely theoretical idea, a border is little
more than an arbitrary and imagined line between two states, line of convenience that carries
no intrinsic meaning. Borders are simply a construction, a way of dividing the world into
more manageable pieces. However, centuries of border-conflict, oppressive regimes of
border protection, and the enormous meaning given to citizenship identities delineated by
borders suggest that in reality, borders are a physically meaningful construct. Borders are
particularly important when being born or integrated to a border-delineated state defines the
economic opportunity, class mobility, structural value, and human rights protections that a
person will have. Citizenship is the state of being that gives meaning to borders—citizens
constitute and legitimize the state by their willingness to accept the burdens of being
governed (paying taxes and complying to legal codes, for example) in exchange for a variety
of benefits, both economic and civil, that come from living within the boundaries of a strong
state. The exclusion of those outside the borders of the state from citizenship rights is integral
to “the process of constructing the nationally integrated state— the state that defined the
rights of citizens and simultaneously defined who was to be excluded” (Kerber, 99).
Citizenship is also the primary means by which rights are governed and protected—as the
United Nations’ inability to enforce the Palermo Protocol and its subversion by nationalistic
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policies indicate, international governing bodies have little power to protect rights. Instead,
rights are granted and enforced by states through the nexus of citizenship.
The liberal state and the liberal subject are based on the idea of fixed borders, but
global markets that require the mobility of not only goods and capital but people have made
the exclusion of non-citizens from states much more complicated:
The liberal state and the liberal subject are based on the idea of fixed borders, with
clearly identifiable interests and identities. Yet globalization, which produces the
challenge of migration and non-state actors to the legitimacy of the borders of the
sovereign state and the autonomous subject, indicates otherwise. (Kapur, 38)
On on hand, privileged global elites who bring enormous cultural and physical wherever
they go are granted the mobility to live and travel wherever they like. These “flexible
citizens” are granted the protections and benefits of citizenship wherever they go, as their
business is integral to the global economy (Ong). Terms such as “expat” and “jet-setter”
differentiate this desirable global laborer from their economic opposite, the “migrant.”
Migrants, who cross borders to find jobs and better wages are configured as a drain on the
state whose labor takes jobs from “deserving” citizens, deflates wages, and fosters illicit
labor economies (such as human trafficking).
However, due to the low value of their labor, migrants are not given the same
flexibility to travel across borders— in fact, their claims to any citizenship at all are hardly
legitimate. “If citizenship is linked to work…then what citizenship can be claimed by those
trapped jobless in the underworld of the global marketplace?” asks Jacqueline Bhaba (203).
For those at the bottom of global markets for labor that have been subjected to the
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fluctuations of capitalism, citizenship is an empty construct. Borders are not sites that
constitute identity and grant rights, but obstacles that prevent low-value migrants from
pursuing strategies of economic mobility. These migrants do not cross borders but are
“crossed by them” in their attempts to move about in the lowest levels of the global labor
market.
Anti-trafficking action is a framework in which the tension between migrants
“crossed by borders” and nations whose entire existence is predicated by the meaning of
borders has played out in a variety of problematic ways. The prevention of trafficking has
manifested almost entirely through locking down borders, exacerbating the vulnerability of
migrants and resulting in the very high-risk migration strategies that can lead to the
exploitation and abuse anti-trafficking claims to fight. The promises made in the wording of
the TVPA to take actions to prevent trafficking by alleviating the conditions that motivate
people, particularly women, to take risks in order to migrate has gone unfulfilled. However,
appropriations for this purpose under the original TVPA amounted to only $15 million over 2
years and have not increased since, while “in contrast, the federal government spends nearly
1 billion dollars annually to patrol the U.S./Mexican border” (Smith qtd. in Chapkis, 933).
The majority of the “prevention” measures have been undertaken at border-points,
international ports, and confluence zones between the U.S. and “everywhere else.”
Coordinated efforts by Homeland Security departments such as U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and
U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) to combat human trafficking have been united
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under the “Blue Campaign,” which has undertaken a variety of border patrol and awareness
initiatives to combat trafficking.
Prevention through awareness is the mission of the CBP’s “No Te Engañes” (Don’t
Be Fooled”) campaign, which circulated disturbing Spanish-language anti-trafficking ads in
Mexico and Central America, in addition to key immigrant destination cities in Florida,
Georgia, and Washington (Ahlers). Additionally, the CBP placed posters at southern border
crossings, containing graphic, gritty and violent images of Latin@ women and men (although
most of the posters featured women) being strangled, tied or chained up, and put behind bars
(cpb.gov). The posters bear emotional captions in Spanish: “I paid double, with dollars and
with my liberty,” “I asked God to help me get out of my country and the devil heard me,” and
“they took more than just my papers” (cpb.gov). All of the posters bear the No Te Engañes
slogan: “you too can be a victim of trafficking in persons” (cbp.gov). While the CBP states
that the aim of the campaign “is to raise awareness amongst potential migrants, informing
them of the dangers of human trafficking and help them avoid becoming a victim,” the
campaign seems to hinge primarily on fear. The posters suggest the many ways in which
people can be “fooled” as they attempt to migrate, suggesting that this can happen to anyone
who attempts to cross borders, even those who possess legal documents. While the CBP
acknowledges that “with global demand for labor decreasing, impoverished workers find
themselves taking greater risks than before in order to survive” their main solution seems to
be deterring migration by making potential migrants more fearful of crossing borders than
they are of the economic conditions that compel them to do so.
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The No Te Engañes campaign reflects truth of anti-trafficking efforts in the United
States: the problem is not exploitation, abuse, or inequality; it is the audacity of laborers who
move across national borders and the problems that arise when they arrive. Increased scrutiny
of potential migrants and locked down border control has become the primary way in which
trafficking is prevented, an approach that typifies Bush and now Obama-era national security
agendas. However, the national dialogue surrounding trafficking conceals the anti-immigrant
trends exhibited in anti-trafficking efforts. “The discourse of trafficking needs to be seen as
part of a more general attempt to depoliticise the question of migration,” by making the
closure of porous borders a moral imperative to end “slavery,” instead of a nationalistic
exclusion of dangerous and undesirable migrants (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 142). When
trafficking and immigration are linked in the minds of policy makers and their constituencies,
“attempts to restrict immigration can then be packaged as antislavery measures; would-be
migrants are would-be victims whose safety and well-being are ostensibly served by more
rigorously policing of the borders” (Chapkis 927). Prevention at the border has manifested as
terror: by closing borders and therefore motivating migrants to move through increasingly
dangerous channels, and then fear-mongering about the risk that both licit and illicit
migration presents, anti-trafficking efforts have both created and capitalized upon danger to
migrants.
The focus on border control as a form of prevention detracts from the actual
conditions in which trafficking takes place: an increased and global impetus to migrate for
work. Trafficking vectors follow migrant flows, and irregular migration patterns “play a key
role in shaping trafficking patterns” as the context in which many traffickers are able to
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practice “force, fraud and coercion” against vulnerable migrant peoples (Dinan, 60). No
amount of fearmongering will deter migrants from pursuing economic mobility across
borders, and in increased border crack-down instead creates the very conditions for illicit
channels of migration. It is increasingly evident that as U.S. Border Control and Protection
escalates its efforts, more and more irregular migration channels are established to
compensate for the closure of legal means of border crossing:
Efforts at regulation do not eliminate illegality but play a role in market regulation
since the method, intensity and focus of law enforcement directly reconfigures the
location and form of the illegal activity, as well as the size and structure of criminal
organizations, and the cost and profitability of their activity. (Mahdavi, 46)
Border policing efforts do not prevent trafficking, but instead increase the danger and the risk
that people must take to cross borders, and the cement the importance of cross-border
smuggling as a migration strategy. Border anti-trafficking measures have thus reinforced the
very phenomenon they are attempting to alleviate by forcing people into patterns of irregular
and vulnerable migration.
Since the prevention of trafficking at borders does more to harm potential victims of
trafficking than to help them, why are these efforts favored so heavily over structural
programs that may alleviate the “push” factors driving immigrants over national borders and
into vulnerable contexts? The answer is rooted in national security: trafficking, as a facet of
illegal migration, plays on nationalistic fears about takeover of the national by immigrant
workers:
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The worsening economic situation for many countries, and the growing polarity
between rich and poor countries, has led inhabitants of rich countries to feel that they
are under threat from hordes of ‘economic migrants’ out to grab what they can...it is
precisely in these times of crisis, when community identities are threatened, that the
policing of boundaries becomes paramount. (Doezema, 44)
If the migrant laborer whose willingness to work for low wages undercuts the economic wellbeing of American citizens, how much more threatening are “victims of trafficking” who can
do the same work for free? “The image of the Victim of Trafficking is used to invoke an
emotional reaction and an image of large numbers, echoing fears of ‘floods’ and ‘hordes’ of
(‘illegal’) migrants,” and while victims of trafficking elicit “pity rather than fear, but the
effects are very similar” (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 137). Through border control, both
feared and pitied migrants can be excluded together and the boundaries of American
nationality protected from outside threats.
The deep-seated nationalistic concerns revealed by this response are reflected in the
ideological links forged between the War on Trafficking and the War on Terror in the process
of regime change. Border protection has been embraced as a primary strategy to deter
terrorism in post-9/11 security regimes, and the confluence of the two security concerns of
trafficking and terror has constructed global migrant flows as a primary threat to American
security. The person who suffers most under the anti-trafficking, anti-terror regime is
ultimately the migrant:
The space for the migrant is being eroded through the discourse of trafficking and the
discourse of terrorism and threats to the security of the nation. Yet criminalizing or
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victimising those who cross borders forces these people to continue to move through
illicit channels and to remain vulnerable, stigmatized, and illegitimate. It seems
unlikely that the security of what is left of the nation-state can be achieved at the cost
of the security of the alien migrant...it will only serve to encourage the construction of
a paradox, where the security of the alien migrant is perhaps less threatened by
people-smugglers and clandestine migrant-mobility regimes than by the current
international system of protection offered to people who moves as migrants, refugees,
or asylum-seekers. (Kapur, 36)
In an effort to protect national security, the border security regime of the United States has
positioned itself (not trafficking) as the primary peril migrants face. The goal of preventing
trafficking has catalyzed, in practice, as an imperative to prevent cross-border migration and
the multiple threats that migration poses to the state. While trafficking prevention may have
originally contained lofty goals of increasing economic opportunity everywhere, these
concerns have been abandoned in favor of protecting American sovereignty.
Protection and Prosecution
Protection for trafficking victims through the T-Visa was one of the major provisions
of the TVPA, and hailed as a triumph by many anti-trafficking activists. However, despite
legislator’s beliefs that a “flood” of immigrants would lay claim to trafficking protections,
out of a potential 5,000 per year only only 6,206 T-Visa requests were granted between 2002
and 2013 (Pei). Attempts to find and protect victims have resulted in a regime of
hypervisibility where the category of victims of trafficking “emerges through the very
practices of security that states deploy towards migrants,” as victims are identified at borders,
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through federal investigations, and through the criminal justice system (Aradau, 6). However,
once identified, “protection is offered selectively and at a cost: it only stretches to those
deemed innocent, while it persecutes, criminalizes, or ignores those who are seen as
complicit in their victimization” (Soderlund, 83). For the populations that are made hypervisible through anti-trafficking efforts, protection has overwhelmingly manifested as
prosecution.
One of the primary problems that law enforcement faces when following federal antitrafficking mandates is victim-identification—actually detecting victims who fit into the
narrative of “severe trafficking” is extremely difficult. As a result, victim-identification has
become a major part of federal “protection” strategies. In addition to efforts by the CBP to
identify victims at borders, one of the main victim-identification tactics used to identify
victims of trafficking is the mobilization of citizens to conduct their own surveillance on
migrant populations and economic activities, and identify potential victims. In 2009, the ICE
launched the Hidden in Plain Sight awareness campaign, designed to spread information
about victim identification and provide the public with the number of the Homeland Security
Tip Line--a phone number used to report any suspected immigration violations (Contreras).
In addition to a TV spot, the Hidden in Plain Sight campaign placed billboards in major
immigrant destination cities around the United States, including Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles,
Miami, New York, San Francisco, and Tampa (Contreras). The billboard featured the tip line
number and a large image of brown eyes set in a brown-skinned face. The implications of
including that particular image with a plea to the public to re port potential victims of
trafficking, particularly in these migrant-worker heavy cities, are racial--turning the scrutiny
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of the public on already marginalized populations under the guise of victim identification.
Awareness campaigns thus reinforce racial divisions as well as divisions of licit and illicit
populations by deputizing the general population: “the policies of many so-called ‘trafficking
destination countries’ reflect another aspect of ‘boundaries’: the fear of the racial/cultural
‘other’”(Doezema, 43).
The major problem with victim-identification by the state is that identification is no
guarantee of protection. The identification of victims makes them visible to a state whose
primarily motivation is exclusion, and has no incentive to protect those who do not fall into
its limited definition of trafficking. In their analysis of a British poster campaign similar to
“Hidden in Plain Sight,” Anderson and Andrijasevic argue that the promise of protection that
these awareness campaigns offer to both abused migrant workers and the citizens who
identify them is a hollow one:
Not all those horrendously abused or caught in what some people describe as ‘modern
day slavery’ will count administratively as victims of trafficking even when they are
migrants who are grossly exploited...The consequences, for those who may fit the
descriptive but not the administrative categories, are that the promises that ‘you have
nothing to fear from the authorities’ are simply not true. (Anderson and Andrijasevic
2009, 154)
Instead, for the vast majority of migrant workers who fall under the scope of the trafficking
framework, the failure to fit into the trafficking narrative excludes them from the services and
immigration assistance offered to victims of trafficking, while those that are able to
convincingly identify themselves as “trafficked” are rarely offered long-term immigration
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solutions. The extension of protection only to those who are useful in prosecution suggest
that “the T-visa, then, is designed not so much as a means to assist the victim as it is a device
to assist prosecutors in closing down trafficking networks” (Chapkis, 932). To convince their
rescuers that they are victims, they must demonstrate that they were coerced to leave their
sending countries, and as soon as they cease to be useful, are returned home.
Protection therefore relies on a “victim’s” ability to convincingly perform
victimization, tailoring her experiences to preconceived notions about the nature of
trafficking. In applications for T-Visas, the burden of proving that she has been trafficked
frequently falls on the victim, and to be considered a viable candidate her trafficking
experience must fit into “a normative narrative of victimhood” that reproduces assumptions
about extreme exploitation and abuse (Andrijasevic qtd. in Sharma, 104). The normative
narrative of victimhood is not only gendered (the focus on sex trafficking in the TVPA was
included specifically to address the belief that trafficking happens to women and girls) but
also requires women to show that they are undeniably coerced. Willing participation in the
sex industry or in her migration process at any point casts the veracity of a victim’s claim to
trafficking into doubt. Visa programs created for victims of trafficking “demand that women
applying for legal status both denounce and leave sex work. Women who do not perform the
role of trafficked victim or whose performance is not believed by state authorities cannot
legalize their status and are often deported” (Sharma, 104). The focus on the victim of sex
trafficking in both the TVPA and the legal response mandated by the law makes it difficult
for those who are forced to labor and abused into other sectors, or those whose consent has
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not been verifiably violated, to access the category of a “victim of trafficking,” and the
accompanying protections.
Moreover, the focus on sex trafficking embedded in the the TVPA has resulted in
hyper-scrutiny of sex workers and migrant sex workers in particular. Despite current
information that labor trafficking is far more common, the criminal justice system has
focused overwhelmingly on the sex industry:
A review of prosecutions commenced under the TVPA shows that sex cases far
exceed the number of labor cases...sex trafficking cases are easier for law
enforcement to prosecute than labor cases are. Sex cases tend to focus on brothel and
massage parlor situations, the kinds of establishments that police vice units can easily
target and then report to federal officials if they find evidence of trafficking. With the
passage of the TVPA, officials at state and local levels have become more sensitive to
the fact that prostitutes in immigrant neighborhoods might be trafficking victims and
thus subjects of interest. (DeStefano, 83)
The inordinate focus by law enforcement on the sex industry as a potential site of trafficking
and migrant sex workers as potential victims “belies the reality that non-sex-sector
trafficking accounts for nearly as many--and arguably more--trafficking cases
worldwide” (Chuang, 1696). However, as a community that already lives on the margins of
the law, migrant sex workers are an easy target for legal action. It is not a matter of grave
concern for law enforcement if prostitutes get put in the way of punishment or illegal
immigrants deported in the process of victim identification.
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On June 30th, 2005 a combined force of over 1,000 federal and state officers
descended on Los Angeles and San Francisco, targeting fifty Korean brothels. This was the
culmination of “Operation Gilded Cage,” which targeted a supposed sex trafficking ring
operating all along the West Coast (DeStefano 2007). In this grandiose charge of the cavalry,
over one hundred women were “rescued” and taken into “non-punitive custody” (DeStefano
2007, 92). Of these one hundred, fifty-three “were deemed non-material (unlikely to have
significant evidence or uncooperative)” and were subject to deportation (DeStefano). Of the
29 people charged in the case, a year later only 14 defendants were still facing criminal
proceedings. Many, such as the taxi driver “who did no more than drive women on two
occasions to a brothel” were dismissed or given only minimal charges (DeStefano 2007, 93).
Operation Guilded Cage revealed fundamental misunderstandings between federal
definitions of trafficking and the lived realities of those supposedly “saved” by the TVPA:
As allegations in the Operation Gilded Cage indictment showed, the managers took
control of women’s passports and travel documents to ensure that they would repay
their debts. Although the law considers such an arrangement to be a form of debt
bondage, many of the women had agreed to it beforehand. They saw it as a condition
of employment that allowed them to migrate to the United States and tap into a
potentially lucrative job. (DeStefano 2007, 93)
The stories, motivations, and ambitions of many of the women taken in Operation Gilded
Cage did not fit into the narrative of trafficking embedded in the TVPA. As a result, they did
not have access to the protections that the legislation offers and were classified instead as
illegal immigrants, subject to prosecution and subsequent deportation. Given their

58
willingness to work in conditions of debt bondage in the sex industry in order to remain in
the United States and earn money, by revealing their lack of legitimate immigration status to
the eyes of the federal government Operation Gilded Cage did more to harm these women
than their “traffickers” ever did.
As Operation Gilded Cage made evident, identification as victims doesn’t
consistently end in protection for irregular migrants, as their access to immigration assistance
is not only predicated by their ability to fit certain trafficking narratives, but their usefulness
to law enforcement investigations. Identification as a potential victim of trafficking,
particularly to the ICE, directly counteracts the victim’s original purpose migration, to enact
a strategy of economic mobility. Even when this strategy results in precarious and dangerous
situations for migrant workers, frequently they prefer to remain in exploitative and abusive
situations rather than risking return to their countries of origin. “Many women consider
deportation an even worse prospect than accepting the situation in which they find
themselves, and try to survive in the hope that at some point they will succeed in realizing
their original aims for migration” (Marjan, 75). The result of their desire to remain in the
Unites States is that “trafficked persons invariably live hidden and invisible lives. Much of
their energy is spent upon averting either state agents such as law enforcement officers from
apprehending them” (Sanghera, 9). Their constant state of deportability creates the conditions
for abuse, and through identification, potential victims of trafficking are brought into the
sphere of the very authorities that they have remained in exploitative situations specifically to
avoid. When their stories do not align with the definition of trafficking fixed in the TVPA,
they are re-classed as illegal immigrants and deported. “Victim” is an exclusive category, that
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most narratives will not be able to conform to. “The ability to achieve definitional agreement
about what constitutes trafficking comes with a price,” writes Musto, “namely the
insufficient identification, visibility, and protection of trafficked persons whose experiences
do not align with dominant discourses” (2009, 286). Contrary to its conceptualization as a
tool to identify and thus protect victims, the definition of victimhood in the TVPA
(particularly the built-in assumption that victimhood is a protected class that many
“undeserving” migrants will wish to access) does significantly less to help migrants than
policy makers and agenda-setters had hoped.
Even if those identified under these protective matrices are able to gain a T-Visa and
thus avoid prosecution, that doesn’t necessarily translate into permanent status. The T-Visa
only allows continued residence for as long as victims of trafficking are useful to the
prosecution of traffickers. To achieve permanent residence status “victims must also
demonstrate that they would ‘suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm
upon removal from the United States’” (TVPA, sec. 107 [F] ii, qtd. in Chapkis, 932). The
extension of permanent resident status to victims was conditioned by reports of retaliation
against victims that returned to their home countries, but where safe for victims repatriation
is the favored strategy for victim assistance:
As definitions of trafficking do not fail to mention, migration, prostitution and
irregular work have been external forceful impositions on these victims. Victims of
trafficking are eventually voluntarily returned home, after having testified against
their traffickers and having undergone more or less extended periods of rehabilitation.
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Instead of deportation, voluntary return. Instead of detention centres, rehabilitation
shelters. Instead of illegal immigrants, victims. (Aradau, 2)
The effect, for the victim, is the same as if she had been immediately deported and treated as
an illegal immigrant. However, in the dominant narrative about trafficking (the narrative that
her protection is conditional upon her identification with) she has been completely coerced in
her removal from her home. Her return is read as the happy conclusion to her story and the
success of anti-trafficking policy, rather than an obstruction of her migratory goals and
ambitions.
Protection and punishment or prosecution are thus distinctly confused by the antitrafficking rhetoric. “Rescue has become code for deportation, where rescue maintains
positive and helpful connotations to its more menacing deportation counterpart,” but “many
rescue strategies are premised on the notion that migrants wish to go home, that home is a
clear cut place, or that home is a better option for them than their current
situation” (Mahdavi, 61). Return to the economic and social conditions that may have
prompted migrants to move through illicit and dangerous channels is rarely the lasting
solution that the protection and repatriation narrative would suggest. Additionally, while this
may not constitute “unusual and severe harm,” if upon repatriation, it becomes known in her
community that a woman was “trafficked,” the conflation of sex work and trafficking will
frequently result in her stigmatization as a prostitute. In reality “identification as a ‘trafficked
person’ [increases] obstacles to reintegration” rather than offering protection and assistance
to victims as they are sent back to where they came from (Napier-Moore, 243). “In the shift
from illegal migration to an emphasis on the human rights of victims of trafficking...what
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appears to change is rather the form of incarceration or the mode of normalization,” through
the shift from fear of invasive immigrants, to pity of helpless victims of trafficking (Aradau,
2). However, “the logic of their removal from the space of the political community they
attempted to enter irregularly remains the same:” deported or rescued, for migrants
attempting to remain in the United States, the effect of the shift in frameworks is much the
same (Aradau, 2).
As an instrument for prosecuting “trafficking” the TVPA has actually proved to be
rather ineffective. In fact, a review of trafficking cases reveals that they frequently turn into
immigration cases, where no protections are offered to “victims” and the offense is not one of
human rights abuse, but border violation:
The first prosecution under the [TVPA] was initiated in January 2001 and involved
Russian women and a strip club in Alaska….although federal prosecutors had
promoted the case as the first prosecution under the new trafficking law, they quickly
decided to drop the charges related to kidnapping and forced labor...Allegations that
some of the dancers were younger than age sixteen was only a small part of the case;
primarily, it concerned immigration fraud. (DeStefano, 47)
The failure of the TVPA as a criminal justice framework became a trend. Early prosecutions
under TVPA had “a conviction rate of 60 percent, which is below average for federal
prosecutors, who usually convict 80-90% of indicted defendants” (49). While the primary
purpose of the TVPA had been the “framing of trafficking as a crime problem,” in reality
trafficking cases quickly diverged into crimes of immigration (Farrell and Fahy, 623). The
relationship between trafficking persecutions and immigration persecutions was reflected in
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the consistent targeting of immigrants as traffickers. There is a consistent theme in trafficking
cases: immigrant employers are convicted for “enslaving” their domestic workers, crime
networks composed of immigrants are broken up, immigrants use their transnational
connections traffic other immigrants into brothels, and police crack down on trafficking in
liminal zones such as American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands (United States
Department of Justice, DeStefano). “The crediting of trafficking to the foreign ‘Other,’ who
is configured as a threat to Western societies and civilization, serves thus as a scare tactic to
corral racist, nationalist sentiments and to obfuscate the interaction between the state,
corporate capital, and underground sectors” (Kempadoo, 2012, xxvii). However, more
consistently “those trafficked into non-Sex sectors tend to be viewed simply as exploited
migrants rather than trafficked persons; the problem is viewed as one of hiring illegal
immigrants, not of abusive labor conditions” (Chuang, 1698). While trafficking prosecutions
have expanded to look at forced domestic servitude, in general, the closer exploitative
working conditions are to the formal or industrial economy, the less likely they are to be
viewed as trafficking offenses. Abused migrant laborers in manufacturing, construction, and
agriculture do not fall under the scope of trafficking—by undercutting American workers,
these laborers create the conditions of their own abuse and their deportation is of little
consequence.
By increasing scrutiny of migrant communities as both potential victims and potential
traffickers, the trafficking framework offers prosecution where it claims to protect, and
resulting in the hypervisibility of vulnerable communities. Wendy Chapkis suggests that
ultimately, trafficking serves as a politically-motivated moral front to deeper anti-immigrant
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agendas, “creating a politically strategic exception to a punishing rule” (Chapkis, 924). The
mobilization of state apparatuses to combat trafficking detracts attention from the state’s
complicity in creating the context in which the abuses currently classified as
“trafficking” (and a wide range of other abuses that don’t fit into this narrow definition)
occur. Instead, by their theatrical pursuit of the real “bad guys,” the government positions
themselves as heroes: “abuse of migrants becomes fully the fault of traffickers who must be
stopped, not the by-product of exploitive employment practices, restrictive immigration
policies, and vast economic disparities between rich and poor nations” (Chapkis, 926). Those
who bear the cost of this strategy are the migrant men and women targeted as both potential
victims and perpetrators of trafficking, then re-framed as immigration offenders.
The blurred lines between prosecution and protection that constructs both victims and
traffickers as a threat highlights the ultimately nationalistic function of trafficking paradigms:
“Anti-trafficking campaigns act as the moral regulatory arm of White nationalist movements
by denying migration to those who are deemed incapable of deciding for themselves if and
when they should move” (Sharma, 105). Trafficking is a framework through which race,
nationality, and global class are reinscribed; disguised as a humanitarian agenda and
“mobilized to simultaneously help illegal migrants as well as maintain and legitimize the
state’s repressive actions towards them” (Sharma, 94). The problem is not, primarily, that
people are trafficked: the problem is the global redistribution of people across borders, and
the challenges that this redistribution poses to the ideological composition of nationality and
state sovereignty. The convergence between the oppressive state apparatuses of deportation,
surveillance, and punishment in anti-trafficking practice “points not to the hijacking of the
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anti-trafficking agenda by the state but to the fundamental, anti-migrant assumptions
embedded within it” (Sharma, 94). The discord between the lofty, altruistic goals espoused in
the political framing of anti-trafficking as a moral mission, and the lived effects of this
mission for victims do not indicate a corruption of an initially humanitarian cause by
government agendas, but instead highlight the global class divisions intrinsic to the
trafficking framework and the complicity of anti-trafficking efforts in replicating inequality.
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Chapter 3
Hegemony and the Trafficking in Persons Report
Ending modern slavery must remain a foreign policy priority. Fighting this crime wherever it
exists is in our national interest. Human trafficking undermines the rule of law and creates
instability. It tears apart families and communities. It damages the environment and corrupts
the global supply chains and labor markets that keep the world’s economies thriving.
-Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Introduction to the 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report
The TVPA has had a major impact beyond the domestic sphere—since trafficking is
an issue that frequently takes place in international contexts, the law also includes guidelines
on how countries can best combat trafficking (modeled on the United States’ response) and
creates foreign policy prescriptions around these guidelines. Using these definitions, the
United States positioned themselves as world trafficking police through the production of the
foremost international report on trafficking, the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. Through
the TIP Report, the United States’ has exported its anti-trafficking agenda, particularly to the
most politically vulnerable nations. Although the TIP Report’s methods, veracity, and policy
recommendations are extremely questionable and increase the difficulties faced by the
populations the TIP Report supposedly protects, the report continues to be a powerful tool in
the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. The combined effect of these two policy tools, the
TVPA and the TIP, is the global enforcement of U.S. policy attitudes and ideologies under the
“a-political” guise of anti-trafficking:
Like the war on terrorism, what abolitionists have called the global “War Against
Trafficking” is decidedly U.S. directed. The United States is also using its status as a
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superpower and major donor nation to force other countries to allow its citizens to
raid brothels and send prostitutes into rehabilitation programs as well as to create
domestic legislation that further criminalizes sex trafficking (and by extension other
forms of prositution). (Soderlund, 76)
However, despite the use of the TIP to exercise power over entire nations, there is “a
troubling lack of independent assessment of U.S. anti-trafficking foreign
interventions” (Chuang 1723-4). There is no critical or objective measure of how the policy
prescriptions that the U.S. mandates for the world actually effect trafficking. Instead an
increasing body of work suggests that “rather than combatting trafficking, global police
initiatives such as the TIP report produce conditions of illegal migrancy” (Mahdavi, 66). In
this chapter, I will discuss how the Trafficking in Persons Report has been leveraged as a
foreign policy tool, eliciting policy responses from nations that fall under the Report’s scope
that mirror the United States’ approach to anti-trafficking. I will argue that by promoting the
closing of international borders and heightened law enforcement activity, the United States is
actually perpetrating an approach to trafficking that serves its national interests, attempting to
stem the flow of problematic migrants. I will discuss how the real cost of these policies is
paid by the most vulnerable and how the targeting of female migration that has resulted in
paradigm where women who face increasing pressure to migrate are forced into illicit
migration. The US-led global movement to end trafficking is ultimately a hegemonic project
that favors cosmetic solutions over real change, and fails to address the actual causes of
global migration.
America, Global Sheriff
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The TIP Report has become an international standard in assessment of anti-trafficking
response. Frequently cited by officials, reporters, and anti-trafficking activists, “the Reports
have become part of the global human rights architecture, accepted by the human rights
establishment as ‘an effective tool for holding governments accountable’” (Amnesty
International 2010 qtd. in Gallagher, 383). The standards that the report uses to assess the
efficacy of trafficking policies are laid out in the TVPA, and focus primarily on the
compliance of governments to the 3P model (TVPA of 2000, sec. 104). However, the
demonstrated influence of political agendas on the formation of the TVPA and its definitions
of trafficking suggest that these standards are anything but neutral assessments and instead
depend on biased perceptions of trafficking, the ideologies of particular influential groups,
and the political needs of the state. The predominance of the TIP Report as an international
standard that draws its definitions from the United States’ definitions of trafficking rather
than the United Nations troublingly indicate that “the performance of governments with
respect to trafficking is currently being assessed, not with reference to the international rules
that states (including the USA) have collectively developed and freely accepted, but against
criteria drawn up and imposed by US bureaucrats and politicians” (Gallagher, 382). The
political nature of the report has resulted in its use as leverage against the perceived political
enemies of the United States, particular through the option to sanction countries that the
United States does not perceive as meeting minimum standards. In the dominant antitrafficking discourse, “the TIP Report constitutes an example of the United States exerting
moral leadership in the world” and is an important tool for fighting global slavery
(Soderlund, 76). However, this valorization of the report and US anti-trafficking leadership
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ignores the “larger foreign policy goals” that are written into the report’s anti-trafficking
rankings (Soderlund, 76).
The primary function of the Trafficking in Persons Report is to organize the countries
of the world into “tiers,” based on that government’s response to trafficking. The 2013
Trafficking in Persons Report contains colored maps that give a picture of the global
distribution of the tiers. “Tier One” countries, colored in green, are notably concentrated in
particular parts of the globe. Most of Western Europe is green, as is the United States,
Canada, and Australia. In Asia, South America, the Middle East, and Africa, few green
countries appear, and those that are green have a particular thing in common: a strong
diplomatic relationship with the United States, or open acceptance of United States military
interventions. Israel is the only green point in the map of the Near East, South Korea and
Taiwan are the only green countries in Asia, Colombia and Colombia and Nicaragua—
countries with a strong U.S. military presence—are the only green countries in South
America.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the red Tier 3 countries. While these appear
all throughout the Global South, suggesting a relationship between the “development”
trajectory of a country and its willingness or ability to legislate trafficking, Tier 3 also
contains every country with traditionally tense relations with the United States. The list
inckludes all four officially designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and
Iran, as well as China, Libya, Russia, and North Korea. All countries in Tier 3 can be subject
to withdrawal of non-humanitarian aid on the basis of their response to trafficking. Inbetween these two extremes are a variety of countries, primarily former Soviet Bloc countries
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and former colonies, that fall into Tier 2 and the Tier 2 watchlist categories. While countries
in the middle can drift between categories, Western or “developed” allies of the United States
remain consistently at the top, while diplomatic enemies of the United States are fixed at the
bottom. Until 2011, the United States did not even include itself in its own assessment, and
upon its inclusion has never wavered from its Tier 1 status.
While the TIP Report claims that these rankings are based solely on objective
information about the prevalence of trafficking in certain countries and the efficacy of
official response, the information-gathering techniques used in the report are neither
particularly transparent or consistent with standards of scientific rigor. The first report,
produced in 2001, “confidently cited unverified and unverifiable statistics, declining to
acknowledge the complexity of the trafficking phenomenon and the immense difficulties
involved in obtaining and synthesizing credible data” (Gallagher, 385). Upon closer
examination, it became apparent that the information for country reports had been obtained
through brief consultations with foreign embassies, whose own information-gathering
techniques underwent no scrutiny. The State Department’s “self-proclaimed ‘rigorous’
evaluative methodology appeared to be little more than a crude information-collection
exercise, delegated to untrained embassy officials” (Gallagher, 385). While the scope of the
report has expanded and information-gathering techniques have become more refined since
its conception, the data still relies heavily on information provided by embassies, whose
presence in other countries serves specific foreign policy agendas. There is an obvious
incentive to gather information that supports certain foregone conclusions about the nature
of trafficking, and for the State Department to interpret that information in a particular way.
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In many ways, the TIP report is a tool to globally reproduce the United States’
definition of trafficking and appropriate responses around the world (despite the fact that an
international definition already exists). The minimum standards that the report uses to assess
countries are directly stated in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which mandates the
production of the report and acquires funds for its continued existence. The anti-prostitution
politics written into the TVPA are therefore reflected in the TIP Report, further demonstrating
the link between the political maneuverings of Washington and a supposedly objective and apolitical report. From the very beginning, the report has promoted ant-trafficking measures
that include increased supervision and circumscription of the commercial sex industry,
insisting on the yet-unproved causal link between sex work and trafficking (as opposed to
other forms of sectors). The first TIP report focused almost exclusively on sex trafficking,
and this legacy is continued through the report’s focus on brief tableaus that highlight stories
of victimization within the sex industry; showing an obvious preference for victim narratives
that take place within the context of the sex trade. However, in many other ways the TIP
Report is not subtle about its anti-prostitution stance. In the 2013 report, a special section of
the introduction focused on the linkages between commercial sex and trafficking, promoting
government efforts to curb demand for commercial sex (27). “Too often, trafficking victims
are wrongly discounted as ‘consenting’ adults,” the Report claims, “the use of violence to
enslave trafficking victims is pervasive, but there are other—more subtle—forms of fraud
and coercion that also prevent a person from escaping compelled servitude” (TIP Report
2013, 27). By including a range of invisible forms of coercion in its scope of analysis, the
TIP Report has engaged in a vast problematization of consent. Particularly in the context of a
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discussion about prostitution, the Report is suggesting that all sex work is potentially nonconsensual through “subtle forms of fraud and coercion” and that to detect trafficking, all sex
workers (even those that seem like “consenting adults”) should be brought under government
purview. The TIP Report has fostered “protection in the form of surveillance” and as in the
United States, has “shifted governmental attention away from migrants’ rights (the real heart
of trafficking violations) to hyperscrutiny of the sex industry” (Mahdavi, 64-5). While the
report has expanded to analyze other forms of labor abuse, there is no indication that it is
moving away from its anti-prostitution stance, and sex remains at the heart of the TIP’s
“colonial gaze” (Doezema, 37).
Moreover, the TIP Report is not simply an incriminating information-gathering
exercise. The Report puts tools “at the administration's disposal [that] can be used to further
other geopolitical ends and are inseparable from the larger arena of international
politics” (Soderlund, 77). The morality of trafficking has been mobilized multiple times to
justify the political maneuverings of the United States. After the 2002 report placed several
key allies on the tier 3 lists, “President Bush released a memorandum in which he justified
aid sanctions against certain tier 3 nations while rationalizing his decision to to avoid similar
actions against others,” arguing that the countries exempted from sanction action had all
taken significant steps to combat trafficking since the report was issued (DeStefano, 123).
When similar maneuvers were repeated in the following years, “it seemed clear that
Washington would always find a way to keep tier 3 nations from suffering aid cuts, as long as
those countries weren’t otherwise considered outlaw nations” (DeStefano, 125). The position
of Venezuela, for example vacillates based on the amicability of U.S.-Venezuela relations.
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Venezuela remained in Tier 3 for much of the early 2000’s, when tensions between the Bush
Administration and Chavez were at their height:
When Chavez handily survived a referendum in August 2004, the United States
retaliated by pulling support for $250 million in loans that Venezuela had requested
from international finance institutions. Venezuela's record on trafficking in women
and children was cited as the reason for this diplomatic maneuver. (Soderlund, 76)
Venezuela’s position eventually rose to the Tier 2 watchlist in 2008, dipped back to Tier 3 in
2011 (the same year that the Secretary of State imposed sanctions on Venezuela for exporting
gasoline components to Iran) and returned to the watch list in 2012 (TIP Report 2013, 391;
U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Venezuela”). The open use of TIP status to
leverage economic capitulation in the case of Venezuela is only one of many examples on
how trafficking status has been used in political and economic maneuvering that has
ostensibly nothing to do with trafficking. While these processes carry on largely behind
closed doors, researchers have already discovered the use of trafficking to elicit better
outcomes for the United States in bilateral negotiations with the UAE (Mahdavi, Gridlock).
Additionally, “the TVPA has been used to justify both continued economic sanctions
in Cuba and the continued freeze on diplomatic relations in North Korea” (Soderlund, 77).
The high presence of State Sponsors of Terrorism and Arab-majority countries in the Tier 3
and the Tier 2 watch list also reflect the linked discourses of “traffickingandterror” already
implicit in U.S. fears about international terrorist organizations profiting from human
trafficking (Mahdavi 2014). In these dialogues, the prevalence of trafficking in Arab-majority
countries is a reflection of systemic, culture-wide violence against women and therefore a
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justification for imperialist interventions. Indeed, Mahdavi found that “in conversations with
various TIP officers, the one theme that emerges repeatedly is the need to rescue and save
women in the Middle East who are particularly vulnerable” (2014, 29). Linking trafficking
and violence against women to Arab-majority, Islamic countries justifies the cultural target
that the War on Terror has placed on this area of the world and the wider Arabic diaspora.
The foreign policy demands of the United States are explicitly served by the universal
execution of its national anti-trafficking mandates, an aim perpetrated by the Trafficking in
Persons Report.
Migration Policy and the “Feminization of Survival”
Sanctions are not the only way in which the United States can elicit complicity with
its global anti-trafficking agendas through the TIP Report. There has been a demonstrable
response by countries with less political negotiating power to capitulate to the policy
prescriptions contained in the report and rise to meet the United States’ standards, at least in
appearance. When the Malaysia was downgraded to Tier 3 in 2007, the government’s
“response to trafficking abruptly changed direction” (Gallagher, 389). Although Malaysia
already dealt with the exploitation of foreign workers “through laws related to prostitution
and immigration,” the fact that they did not define trafficking as a crime above and beyond
labor exploitation meant that they did not meet the U.S. minimum standards (Gallagher, 389).
Instead of challenging the trafficking framework as redundant, the Malaysian government
swiftly responded: “A comprehensive law was developed and, with no public discussion,
quickly adopted. Shelters for victims were established. Malaysia's criminal justice agencies
sought and received specialist training in the investigation and prosecution of TIP cases
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(ASEAN 2007) and several prosecutions were initiated” (Gallagher, 389) . Other countries
have attempted to alter their Tier status by curbing female migration, targeting the population
that the TIP report has portrayed as most vulnerable to trafficking:
Many countries have rushed to tighten borders to prevent female migrants in
particular from leaving their homes. Examples of these laws include the Philippine
Household Service Reform Package of 2006, as well as a recent law passed in
Ethiopia, both of which state that women under the age of 30 and unmarried women
should be discouraged from migrating abroad. (Mahdavi, 50)
In a similar vein, Thailand “conducts extensive investigations of female passport applicants
aged 14 to 36 (only), and denies passports, and thus the ability to travel abroad legally, to
those whom public welfare officials believe are ‘being procured to sexual business in foreign
countries’” (Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare qtd. in
Dinan, 67). Responding to anti-trafficking incentives by restricting the mobility of young
women, and in particular young women suspected of being sex workers, actually reproduces
the conditions of vulnerability that create the forms of abuse that qualify as “trafficking,”
along with a range of other exploitative situations. “The problem with these policies is that
women still need to migrate to make ends meet,” writes Mahdavi, “when these laws are
passed, female migrants must rely on illicit networks to facilitate their journeys to countries
with employment opportunities that can ensure their families’ livelihoods” (2014, 50).
Because these policies do not address the underlying motivations for women to migrate, they
fail to alleviate the actual conditions that send women abroad: an increased responsibility for
the welfare of their families, an inability to fulfill this responsibility due to dire economic
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circumstances in their sending countries, and a demand for gendered kinds of labor in
wealthier parts of the world.
A growing body of research indicates that in the last several decades, women make up
an increasing majority of the world’s poor (Footen Bromfield). Women are also playing a
more important role in the support of households, as widespread unemployment in Third
World countries requires that women work to support their families either as a supplement to
their husband’s wages, or because they are the sole providers for their households. Saskia
Sassen calls this trend the “feminization of survival,” as women become increasingly
responsible for both the survival of both families and national economies. Kamala Kempadoo
that the “emerging economic order has already wreaked havoc on women’s lives,” since
despite the fact that women have become a crucial component of the global labor force they
must still “deal with declining real wages, lower wage structures than men and longer
working hours” (Kempadoo 2003, 144). As a result, there is a tremendous incentive for
women to seek out higher-paying work wherever possible—frequently, through overseas
migration.
On the opposite side of this equation lies the demand for women for particular kinds
of gendered labor from nursing to domestic work, from nannying to prostitution. Third World
women are considered ideal for this kind of work, not only because they are willing to accept
lower wages to perform it, but because the conflation of the Third World with
“backwardness” has actually created a market for Third World women for positions that
require care because of their supposed alignment with “traditional” values (Ehrenrich and
Hochschild). In this same paradigm, women of color are also in high demand in the sex
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industry due to their appeal as erotic/exotic subjects for western consumers. “Women of color
remain in various ways racialized as highly sexual by nature, and positioned as ‘ideal’ for sex
work” and as a result the global sex industry has come to “[lean] heavily on the bodies of
women of color” (Kempadoo 2001 40, 33). Sassen characterizes these combined incentives
for women to migrate for work as “push” and “pull” factors. A lack of secure, well paying
jobs at home “push” women from their home countries, where they respond to the “pull” of
labor opportunities in the Global North. Policies that attempt to curtail women’s migration
“are targeted only toward the supply of trafficking or the victims” while ignoring the demand
factors that pull people across borders, through increasingly dangerous and illicit means
(Sanghera, 8).
These policies also ignore the role that women’s earnings play in bolstering national
economies. The earnings of migrant workers have become essential to developing
economies, as “remittances are now the second-largest source of external finance for
developing countries after foreign direct investment” (Dinan, 65). Sassen argues that has
resulted in a dependence on women’s wages in overseas jobs, driven largely by massive
international debt owed to both international organizations such as the World Bank and large
nations such as the United States. Ironically, the economic conditions at home that result in
women seeking work overseas are frequently related to “Structural Adjustment Programs”
imposed on indebted countries that impose contractual economic policy and austerity
measures. As a result of these heavy-handed debt programs, the economic growth of indebted
countries has been anemic and entirely dependent on the whims of the global market. The
anti-migration policies promoted by the Trafficking in Persons Report fundamentally
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misunderstand the causes of global migration and the United States’ complicity in creating
those conditions. The failure of the Report to link
Ultimately, U.S. policy prescriptions have had very little effect on the problems
qualified and quantified as “international human trafficking.” The 2006 GAO report on the
efficacy of anti-trafficking measures analyzed the available data and concluded “there is little
or no evidence to indicate the extent to which different types of efforts—such as prosecuting
traffickers, abolishing prostitution, increasing viable economic opportunities or sheltering
and reintegrating victims—impact the level of trafficking” (GAO 2006, 25). By urging
reactions unfounded in data, the TIP Report has fostered an international response to
trafficking that is “hastily conceived and poorly executed...foreign governments, sometimes
in response to the US tier system, [are] primarily focusing on law enforcement and the
criminalization of trafficking rather than the needs of victims” (DeStefano, 125). The
ultimate result has been a global increase in law enforcement action against populations that
supposedly contribute to trafficking, spurred on by an army of government-backed NGOs.
By promoting a persecutive response that has been widely embraced in the international
community, the TIP Report has elevated the United States to the rank of a Global Sheriff,
deputizing governmental and non-governmental actors alike into its internationally-staged
War on Trafficking.
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Chapter 4
The Problem with Rescue: Savior Discourses and Structural Violence
I am an Abolitionist! Now urge me not to pause; For joyfully do I enlist in Freedom’s sacred
cause, A nobler strife the world never saw than the enslaved to disenthral, I am a soldier for
the war, whatever may befall.
-”I am an Abolitionist,” performed by Justin Dillion
In the global front of War on Trafficking, the most important actors have undoubtedly
been NGO’s deploying state resources to enforce the vision of anti-trafficking laid out in the
TVPA and the TIP Report. Thanks to the discrepancies in funding between abolitionist NGOs
and organizations that embrace a more liberal approach to the sex industry under the antiprostitution pledge, the United States has almost exclusively empowered organizations that
embrace its anti-prostitution approach to combatting trafficking. Even those that do not fully
embrace abolitionist ideology are still compelled to acquiesce to particular models and
agendas by the government’s reservation of its right to with hold funding to organizations
that embrace sex-work positive approaches to combating trafficking. Through the extension
of the anti-trafficking mission to the global arena, “NGOs in the United States increasingly
function as an extension or dislocated arm of state sponsored policies” (Musto, 26). The
proliferation of these NGOs, particularly since the institution of the TVPA, has led to the
creation of a modern and government-subsidized “rescue industry.”
As the lyrics of the 1848 song that Justin Dillon performs in Call + Response suggest,
it is increasingly clear that anti-trafficking activists view themselves as a small coalition of
righteous warriors in a global conflict. On NGO websites, major news networks, and political
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stages the anti-trafficking movement is frequently characterized as the “fight” against
modern-slavery, and (The CNN Freedom Project, Polaris Project, Not For Sale Campaign).
The battle-cry of modern-day slavery has mustered a humanitarian army, deployed in combat
throughout the world. However, as in most wars, the global War on Trafficking has had many
casualties. In this chapter, I will trace the practices, outcomes, and motivations of the modern
anti-trafficking rescue industry. I will discuss the lived experiences that demonstrate that for
the targets of rescue, salvation at the hands of ideological warriors frequently results in
abuse, confinement, and coerced rehabilitation. The purpose of the rescue industry seems to
be primarily self-fulfillment, constructing and perpetrating victimization in order to
constitute its own existence. I will argue that “saviors” empower themselves rather than their
subjects through rescue, justifying their approach through discourses of power, privilege, and
agency.
“Save us from the Saviors”
Overseas NGOs have readily absorbed the rescue model of protection already in
action in the United States. The perceived weakness of many Third World government’s
police response to trafficking enables NGOs to fill the void that law enforcement supposedly
has left:
In gallant rescue attempts—usually broadcast on television and the Internet, but also
increasingly forming the substance of entire books—large sums of money may be
handed over to secure the release of individual ‘slaves,’ generating new sources of
income and new business arrangements for small-time recruiters, people smugglers,
and employers. (Kempadoo, 2012, xxiv)

80
The purchase of “sex slaves” to rescue them from brothels has generated career-defining
media attention for Nicholas Kristof, who bought two Cambodian women from their brothels
and then wrote about their reunions in both his regular column in the New York Times and
best-selling book Half the Sky. Kristof’s almost voyeuristic intrusion into these women’s
lives generated controversy when one of the women (whom Kristof called “girls,” despite
offering no information about their age) returned to her brothel. Kristof credited this rejection
of her rescue to his assumption that she was addicted to meth, and later relayed a tearful
reunion when he once again visited her brothel, at which point she “kneeled on the floor and
begged forgiveness” (Kristof, 39). When Srey Momm was later cast out onto the street by a
brothel raid, she married a a customer in what Kristof sees as a happy conclusion to her story
(Kristof, 40-1).
Going beyond purchasing slaves to free them, NGOs and media stars frequently
partner to coerce local police into action, engaging in highly publicized brothel raids coded
as “rescues.” Kristof controversially rode along with the Somaly Mam organization and
local police while they raided a brothel, sharing the experience live on twitter. The
International Justice Mission partnered with MSNBC to film a special on child prostitution in
Cambodia that culminated in a dramatic brothel raid, captured on camera for American
viewers:
With the consent of the Cambodian government, MSNBC and IJM put together a
self-styled American posse to fill the vacuum left by local law enforcement...Guns
were drawn, sirens blared, children wailed, and panicked men and women ran in
every direction. The IJM investigator rounded up as many children as possible in the
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midst of the ensuing chaos... Raids were conducted throughout Svay Pak that day,
leading to the capture of 37 women and girls, the arrest of madams and pimps, and
the barricading of many of the shantytown's brothels. At the day's end, the women
and children under the investigator's charge were taken to a safe house. They would
be tabulated and referred to as ‘37 victims rescued’ in subsequent International Justice
Mission (IJM) accounts of the raid. (IJM 2004, qtd. in Soderlund, 65)
IJM pioneered this model of combatting trafficking: their male employees go into brothels to
attempt to buy sex from children, then use this information to leverage police into action.
Afterwards, the collected “victims” are taken to safe houses, where they are given access to
health services and other resources that they would need to exit the sex industry—and
encouraged or even required to convert to Christianity to maintain this access. Other NGOs
have embraced rescue projects somewhat disturbing ways. The Stop Child Trafficking Now
initiative claims that they have recruited special operatives “familiar with what it takes to
infiltrate, investigate and bring justice to the predators victimizing children worldwide” (qtd.
in Mahdavi, 18). When the initiative calls these partners “special operatives” they mean it
very literally—they have specifically sought out operatives trained through the war on terror.
However, anti-trafficking organizations’ claims about the success of the “raid, rescue,
and rehabilitate” model belies the frequently violent experience of brothel raids and police or
NGO intervention for the women working and living in the sex industry. “Raids are often
violent not only for those accused of being traffickers but also for the sex workers
themselves,” write Aziza Ahmed and Meena Seshu of Indian sex workers’ collective VAMP,
“the insistence on using the police in the context of raids and rescues has been pushed by
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neo-abolitionists despite the evidence of police violence against sex workers” (155). Contrary
to the confident assertions of NGOs that these raids “rescue” victims of trafficking, “Sex
workers who are rounded up during police raids are beaten, coerced into having sex by
corrupt police officials in exchange for their release or placed in institutions where they are
sexually exploited or physically abused. The raids also drive sex workers onto the streets,
where they are more vulnerable to violence” (World Health Organization qtd. in Ahmed and
Seshu, 155). In her fieldwork in the United Arab Emirates, Mahdavi recounts the story of
Layla, a sex worker who personally experienced “rescue” by law enforcement:
They [the police] said they were coming to help us. To save us, they said. But they hit
us, treated us like animals. One of them grabbed me by my hair and threw me in the
truck. My friend Laudan was taken in the back and raped by another officer...then
they sent us to jail. (qtd. in Mahdavi, 59).
Layla was then interrogated by police for information about her traffickers:
“I didn’t have a trafficker, I didn’t even know what that was,” Layla remembered.
“So, they beat me. They said they would beat his name out of me”...They told her she
was not eligible for residence in the local women’s shelter and would receive no
protection because she was uncooperative and did not testify against her trafficker.
(Mahdavi, 60)
During her time in police custody, Layla and her fellow prisoners were visited by a social
worker. “This lady kept saying she was there to help, that she was going to help us all go
home...But we didn’t want to go home, we wanted to stay in Abu Dhabi and keep working.
(Mahdavi, 59). Layla was eventually returned to Iran, where her family learned that she had
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engaged in sex work, beat her, and threw her out. At the time of her interview, she was living
homeless in Tehran.
While Layla’s inability to fit her story the trafficking narrative made her ineligible for
services, those who are rescued and brought to shelters rarely fare better. After one IJM
mission into brothels in Chiang Mai, Thailand, “police descended on two brothels and two
nearby houses and rounded up 43 women and girls” (Jones). While IJM counted this as a
successful rescue, reporter Maggie Jones followed the women and girls beyond their
“rescue” to their “rehabilitation:”
The rescued women and girls were locked into two rooms of an orphanage by Public
Welfare authorities, and many of them hardly seemed relieved...During the one hour
each day when they were allowed outside the building, four girls soon slipped out the
front gate and disappeared. A few nights later, 11 of them strung together sheets,
shimmied down the second-floor window of the orphanage, and climbed over a
concrete and wire fence. Nine more ran away weeks later. During one of the escape
attempts, a woman fell from a second-story window and was hospitalized with back
injuries. (Jones)
Jones’ story, although unique because published on a quasi-mainstream news site, reflects
what those who have been working directly with the “victims” of trafficking in order to
document their experiences have already confirmed. The assumption that these girls had been
“rescued” was belied by their attempts to leave their shelters at risk to their own well-being,
suggesting that while women may experience oppression, violence, and abuse in a variety of
labor contexts (the sex industry not excluded), this does not necessarily mean that they need
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to be rescued. Rescue presumes removal from an oppressive and coercive situation into a
state of freedom, but by escaping from their rescuers women demonstrate that they were
always able to free themselves—and thus, probably did not need freeing in the first place.
Other women taken into these shelters are not able to escape and are detained for long
periods of time, as NGOs have learned lessons about the frequent unwillingness of their
“victims” to undergo rehabilitation. Ahmed and Seshu relate the story of RA, an 18 year old
who took out a loan from VAMP member and brothel-owner KB, and repaid it by working in
her brothel. RA’s loan was quickly repaid, but she continued to work there. However, Indian
Rescue Mission, a local faith-based NGO that receives funding from US-based trafficking
initiative Exodus Road, learned about RA’s loan. Interpreting this arrangement as an example
of debt bondage, they urged local police to conduct a raid. “As described by the sex workers
who were present on the scene, the raid itself was violent with the police dragging the
women out by their hair,” recount Ahmed and Seshu, “when the government hospital
certified that RA was an adult, the magistrate transferred her from the juvenile home to the
government correctional facility” (160). Indian Rescue Mission made a post on their website
about the raid. “Although RA is an adult, the photo accompanying the press release is one of
a crying girl who looks to be approximately four or five years old” (Ahmed and Seshu 2012,
161). Once at the correction facility, RA was kept from contacting VAMP and her friends in
Sangli:
Despite her legal capacity as an adult and her desire to be released, she remained in a
correction home under the auspices of rehabilitation for several months. The
correction home where RA was purportedly rehabilitated is a locked home located an
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hour away from Sangli. Women who are awaiting permission to be released by the
court occupy the home. The rehabilitation activities vary from encouraging
employment in cleaning services at the local hospital to marrying the girls to men that
visit seeking wives. (Ahmed and Seshu 2012, 160)
RA’s experience in the correction home indicates that for many women who fall under the
auspices of anti-trafficking efforts, “rehabilitation has sometimes meant nothing more than a
change in venue of the victim’s incarceration from a brothel to a shelter” (Sanghera, 22). It’s
not uncommon for women to experience violence in these shelters, and while some do find
work outside of the sex industry after leaving the center, “others perceive the rehabilitation
process itself as a punitive form of imprisonment thereby complicating the captivity/freedom
binary asserted by abolitionists” (Soderlund, 66). While the rhetoric of anti-trafficking
constructs “captivity and freedom as diametrically opposed states of existence,” transfer from
a brothel to a shelter is rarely a move between the two—at least not in the direction that
rescue missions suggest (Soderlund, 65). Due to the determination of rescuers to do their
work in spite of their victims’ noncompliance, “in urrent sites and practices of abolitionist
intervention the line between rescuers and captors has become increasingly
blurry” (Soderlund, 65). Rescue, in the lived experiences of those who have been identified
“victims,” is rarely experienced as liberating, but instead as more oppressive than the
situations that they have been “rescued” from.
In a quantitative study of 100 Cambodian sex workers, Joanna Busza, Sarah Castle,
and Aisse Diarra “found that ‘rescued’ women usually returned to their brothel as quickly as
possible,” exercising mobility and agency that, according to rescuers, they don’t possess

86
(1370). Furthermore, “police presence in the raids scared off custom, thus reducing earnings,
increasing competition for clients, and further limiting sex workers’ power in negotiating
improved work conditions” (Busza et al, 1370). Raids also made conditions in brothels more
restrictive and decreased the ability of sex workers to obtain vital services, as “raids and
rescues could also damage the relationship between service providers and brothel managers,
who restricted sex workers’ mobility, including access to health care, to avoid arrest” (Busza
et al, 1370). Busza, Castle, and Diarra’s research support Ahmed and Seshu’s conclusion that
“the ongoing raids disrupt...systems of safety and self-governance established by sex worker
collectives” (Ahmed and Seshu 2012, 162). In many ways, the dynamic solutions that sex
workers have attempted to create in the face of the adversity they have traditionally faced as
populations outside of the protection of the law have been severely curtailed by attempts to
bring “victims of trafficking” under the protection of the law. “Rescue” can be an extremely
violent process, both for those who are deemed worthy of rescue and those whose rights and
well being are violated in brothel raids. As a result, rescue “can feel more abusive than the
ostensible force, fraud, or coercion they are thought to be experiencing” (Mahdavi, 22).
Increasingly, Third World sex workers have started to organize against the humanitarian
efforts of NGOs like the International Justice Mission, publicizing the detrimental effects that
global anti-trafficking regimes have had on their lives and livelihoods. Their fear and anger
is not directed towards the specter of trafficking, but towards the organizations that are
attempting to save them from trafficking: “At a recent global gathering of sex workers in
Kolkata, India...sex workers marched under the banners ‘Save Us From Saviors’ and ‘Rights,
Not Rescues’” (Gira Grant, 5).
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White Savior-Industrial Complex
Despite the outcries of sex workers, the government of the United States and the
NGOs that they partner with have remained willfully ignorant of the effects of their
humanitarian efforts on womens’ lives. “IJM director Gary Haugen says he's never met a
prostitute who's been upset about being rescued,” writes Jones, who obtained a quote from
Haugen upon discovering the lengths that women were going to escaping from shelters: “All
the conversations I've had have been with victims who expressed how grateful they were to
be released from a place of horrific abuse.” Haugen’s remarks indicate his entrenchment in
what Laura Agustín calls noblesse oblige or “noble obligation.” Her decisive work Sex at the
Margins criticizes the construction of charity as a profession during the Victorian era—
simultaneously, as it were, with the panic about White Slavery— and the ongoing effects that
the industrialization of rescue has today. Agustin argues that through rescue, “Victims
become passive receptacles and mute sufferers who must be saved, and helpers become
saviours, a colonialist operation warned against in discussions of western feminism’s
treatment of third-world women and now common in discussions of migrant women who sell
sex” (Agustín, 39). More commonly, this construction of victimhood in order to reproduce
the role of the savior is called the White Savior complex, linking the race and class privilege
that saviors exercise in their global work.
White Saviors prioritize their own compulsion or “obligation” to engage in
humanitarian rescue over the expressed needs of the populations they target. Ostensibly, they
are quicker to defend their own right to intervene against criticisms that their interventions
have denied rights to others. “The savior mentality avoids nuance in its quest for salvation
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and leaves little room for self-doubt,” as objections to their tactics are neatly overridden by
the moral imperative that White Saviors feel to “do something” (Chuang, 1718). Instead,
“doubt is always planted about the condition of the sex worker’s state of mind” and her own
ability to consent to sex work (Agustín, 35). The common assertion among anti-trafficking
NGOs that victims of trafficking have suffered severe trauma and therefore cannot be trusted
to effectively identify themselves as victims of trafficking is so widely accepted that it is now
engrained in official reports. The 2013 TIP report speaks in particular of the “psychological
manipulation” that victims of sex trafficking undergo (29). By problematizing the
psychological soundness of victims, anti-trafficking NGOs are able to easily sidestep
concerns about the carceral practices used in shelters, and even justify further restrictions. If
“victims” escape, they will not be able to access the psychological services needed to deal
with their trauma (or drug addiction, or fear of retaliation) and therefore must be kept under
constant surveillance and detention for their own good:
The ability of the concept ‘victim’ to rob the (feminized) individual of any notion of
agency and subjectivity, and to ideologically locate the migrant woman or sex worker
as helpless and pitiful, has strong implications for how change is imagined or taken
up in policies and interventions. Victims, who by this definition are passive and childlike, are deemed incapable of undertaking any action, thus requiring ‘rescue’ or
‘saving’ from their circumstances by others who stand outside of the trafficking
process and who, it is believed, “know best.” (Kempadoo 2012, xxix).
The White Savior mentality is thus reproduces itself—by ideologically constituting people
and populations as victims and accusing them of trauma if they reject this label or attempt to
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return to the sex industry, Saviors justify their own actions and legitimize intervention where
it is neither necessary or welcome. This categorization of victims as traumatically damaged
and therefore unable to make their own decisions neatly silences all dissent from within the
populations targeted for rescue: “self-proclaimed ‘sex workers’ who defy the dominant
narrative are explained away as suffering from a false consciousness and thereby unaware of
their oppression or as deviant in desiring abuse” (Chuang, 1699). It is the agency of saviors,
not the agency of victims, that is supported by the rescue mentality. Saviors’ voices are
systematically privileged in global discussions about trafficking, so when any one of their
“victims” assert that they have a “right not to be rescued,” their resistance is silenced by the
insistence of the Rescue Industry that they are “voiceless.”
This voicelessness is reinforced by the power of Rescuers vis-a-vis their subject, a
power that is both constructed by western assumptions about the backwardness of the Third
World and the victimization narratives that Rescuers perpetrate. Rescue takes place along
axes of inequity, and through the Rescue Industry the anti-trafficking movement has
reproduced and exacerbated these inequities. The global operations of U.S.-based antitrafficking are “undergirded by a racialized morality” that “inadvertently reinforces
distinctions between white saviors and the minorities who require their help and
interference” (Mahdavi, 58). In her ethnographic work with anti-trafficking NGOs, Elizabeth
Bernstein has chronicled a wide-spread tendency to view trafficking as a culturally-produced
phenomenon produced by Third-World backwardness. At one IJM conference, one attendee
turned to Bernstein after a presentation and remarked that “People in those countries just
don’t know how to treat women!” (2007, 138). The racial and cultural biases implicit in the

90
U.S. response to trafficking are reproduce internationally through the action of nongovernmental actors who operate on “the premise that people, especially in certain parts of
the world or in certain industries require ‘saving’ more than others (most often women,
women of color, or women in the sex industry)” (Mahdavi, 62). The Savior mentality is
implicitly ethonocentric, promoting “a flawed developmentalist framework” and reproducing
global classes of race, ethnicity, and nationality (Mahdavi, 62). This framework is also
explicitly gendered. Women are the overwhelming target of NGO rescue efforts, largely
because it is assumed that they are the weakest and most vulnerable members of their society
—backwardness and sexism are explicitly linked in trafficking paradigms, further justifying
the turn of the Western philanthropist’s gaze on the Third World.
In this way, NGOs render their subjects doubly victimized: not only are they victims
of their traffickers, but they are victims of the backwardness and oppression inherent in their
cultures and circumstances. In the discourse of rescue, Third World victims are “pictured as
poor, naive, and ‘unempowered’...unable to act as agents in their own lives or to make an
uncoerced decision to work in the sex industry”(Doezema, 37). Their unwillingness to be
rescued is explained away not only by their trauma, but by their inability to exert “free will”
due to their cultural surroundings, lack of education, and poverty. Their protests are rendered
effectively mute by the belief that they are without any agency in their lives and thus cannot
be trusted to know their own minds, desires, or motivations. The Third World woman is
rendered effectively voiceless by her position at the center of all intersecting matrices of
oppression, vindicating the ignorance of her loudly voiced wish not to be rescued.
Those who ultimately benefit from this silence are, of course, the mouthpieces. The
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cycle of victim construction, identification, and rescue grants power to those who control
each of these processes. The rescue industry this specifically reproduces not only itself, but
the inequalities in power that result in the very abuse that it has characterized as trafficking.
As Agustín argues, “the social constructs its own objects in order to study, organise, manage,
debate and serve them” (192). Even “regimes that may appear completely benign on the
surface” hinge on the power of helpers to define, problematize, and respond to constructed
social issues. In short, rescue is a power project that supports the hegemonic position of
rescuers, making them masters of a discourse that they have themselves defined. In the
context of the global reach of anti-trafficking, this power reifies global race and class
distinctions—the humanitarian anti-trafficking army is engaging in its own imperialistic
projects, under the benign facade of rescue.
Neoliberalism as rehabilitation
The focus on the “poverty as force” argument to justify the rescue of women from
conditions that they have consented to only goes so far. While convenient for constituting
women as an absolute and unqualified victim, this analysis does not extend to a more holistic
understanding of the global markets that have systematically concentrated wealth in the
hands of the few. While victimization may be a poverty issue, trafficking as a global
phenomenon is not about disparities in wealth. Gary Haugen has argued in multiple places
that “trafficking is not a poverty issue. It’s a law enforcement issue” (qtd. in Bernstein, 137).
For Haugen, trafficking is not a symptom of global inequality, but of weak governments’
inability to effectively enforce laws, thus justifying the intervention of the IJM’s “posse.”
However, underlying the belief that trafficking is not about global poverty, but about the
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permeability of global borders and the legal disorder in “less developed” areas of the world is
an ignorance of the colonial origins of the economic world order: “The presumed threat of
weak states obscures the role of strong states and neocolonialism in producing a political
economy that leaves some countries less developed than others” (Mahdavi, 29). While IJM
and its compatriots may be very concerned with the protection of the poor, they do not extend
their concern to the global markets that create poverty.
It is this bounded realm of inquiry that allows gestures that would otherwise seem
hypocritical: the conflation of social justice and market action. This linkage between
capitalism and self-actualization is evident by the belief of anti-trafficking organizations that
entry into legitimate labor markets is the final solution to trafficking. As one IJM staffer
revealed to Bernstein, “our real goal is to bring people out of slavery into the free
market” (Bernstein, 140). Much of IJM’s programming involves initiatives to integrate its
Christian humanitarian organizations...orient former prostitutes toward entry-level
jobs in the service economy, teaching women to bake muffins for Starbucks and to
prepare Western-style drinks and food. Other evangelical groups...as well as a
growing number of liberal, secular groups have also hopped on board with the
approach, no longer framing the problem of human trafficking in terms of the broader
dynamics of globalization, gendered labor, and migration, but rather as a
humanitarian issue that global capitalists can help combat. (Bernstein, 140-1)
In 2006, Christianity Today covered a variety of organizations who were in “the ‘business’ of
helping the sexually exploited help themselves” (Herzog Jewell). According the the paper,
these “cutting edge organizations...include work opportunities in their model for personal and
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spiritual restoration...Whether it’d through manufacturing handbags in India or producing
soymilk in Cambodia” (Herzog Jewell). Like the shelter that confined RA, frequently entry
or re-entry into capitalist labor markets is configured as the ideal and ultimate rescue for
victims of trafficking. Being “freed” from slavery means that victims can “escape from ‘the
bleak back rooms of a brothel’ and into a ready-made outside world where former sex-slaves
can return to sometimes oppressive family structures, work in factories, or serve as nannies
and maids for the global bourgeoisie” (Soderlund, 83). The humanitarian arm of the antitrafficking movement has fully embraced the capitalist conception of agency and choice as
something that happens within market relations: helping victims of trafficking has become
synonymous with teaching them to “help themselves.” Through the trafficking framework,
“freedom, either as a utopian quest or bedrock of democratic thought, has apparently been
downgraded to the ability to engage in wage labor” (Soderlund, 83). Whether workers find
themselves equally or even more oppressed upon entry into local labor markets that are
neither stable nor lucrative is not a concern, or even a question that is being asked.
In addition to the perpetration of neoliberal solutions for the victims of trafficking, the
anti-trafficking regime has also promoted similar solutions for consumers, “advocating a
form of political engagement that is consumer and media-friendly, saturated in the tropes and
imagery of the very sexual culture that it aims to oppose” (Bernstein, 140). Anti-trafficking
is, simply put, an extremely lucrative cause. In addition to securing significant government
funding, anti-trafficking organizations have been the recipients of large grants from a variety
of corporate actors. In 2011, Google donated $11.5 million to anti-trafficking organizations,
$8 million of which went to the International Justice Mission (Molko and Cohen). While the
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involvement of millennial-infused Silicon Valley companies in humanitarian initiatives is
perhaps not surprising, the response of corporations to anti-trafficking has not been limited
to liberal businesses. Wall Street has also been the site of several anti-trafficking initiatives,
demonstrating the particular attraction of the anti-trafficking call even to sectors of society
not traditionally known for their global-mindedness:
When Wall Street tycoon Swanee Hunt began pushing her end demand strategy of
ending trafficking through ending demand for sex work (or prostitution, as she
characterizes it), the response of Wall Street was almost audible. Several groups
rushed to fund her initiative, not recognizing the inherent downfalls of the end
demand strategy, nor the problematic nature of framing trafficking as an issue rooted
in the sex industry. (Mahdavi, 31)
The focus on the sex industry as the site of trafficking has, up till now, been viewed as a
result of the “mediagenic” nature of sex crimes and the ease of identifying migrant women
and sex workers as victims, due to their already-marginalized status. However, the fixation of
corporate donors on sex trafficking suggests yet another motivation for focusing on sex.
“Hunt and her friends are not proposing we end demand for sweaters or rugs made by forced
labor, fish caught by men in bondage on fishing boats, or that we end demand for domestic
work,” explains Mahdavi (31). Instead of calling attention to forms of forced labor which
many corporations are at least partially complicit in producing, the fixation on sex keeps
attention on a sector that does not directly benefit American corporations and by extent,
American citizens through the provision of cheap goods. Low-wage labor is essential to
productive economies that “depend on a flexible oversupply of labor and a race to the bottom
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in terms of prices for goods, services, and most recently labor” (Mahdavi, 32). The focus on
sex detracts from this complicity—sex is not a good that most Americans consume (or admit
to consuming), so targeting the commercial sex sector is a sensational but innocuous move.
Thus, for corporate America, the focus on sex trafficking instead of other forms of trafficking
is literally more affordable.
While some anti-trafficking campaigns have started to draw attention to the
complicity of American corporations and consumers in buying products made by exploited
laborers, this exploitation is bounded by “slavery.” For example, Call + Response attempts to
position itself as not only a film, but an entire social movement by initiating campaigns such
as the “Chain Store Reaction” to demand “slave free standards.” While Call + Response’s
focus on sexual slavery makes it unclear what exactly “slave free” standards for
manufactured would look like, it can be assumed that the majority of workers would not be
considered slaves. By calling for the elimination of “slave labor,” these kinds of projects
ignore and normalize the spectrum of labor violations that vulnerable populations face.
Ultimately, by advocating for consumption-motivated response to trafficking, “the modus
operandi of NGOs that have appropriated ‘new slavery’ rhetoric is to wage neoliberal,
consumer campaigns wherein citizens are turned into consumers and encouraged to ‘shop
their way to social justice and change’” (Musto 2009, 284).
Even the Federal Government has embraced the model of consumption-as activism.
In 2012, the Obama Administration announced the “Made in a Free World initiative to help
buyers and suppliers identify and eliminate supply chain vulnerabilities” as well as the
creation of the “Global Business Coalition Against Trafficking” (Office of the Press
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Secretary). The State Department has even provided free advertisement for businesses that it
sees as taking a stand on trafficking, highlighting a “fair food agreement” between fast-food
chain Chipotle and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers in the 2013 Trafficking in Persons
Report (U.S. Department of State, 11). Participation in philanthropy has become marketable.
By encouraging consumers to shop “slave free,” anti-trafficking efforts are promoting market
solutions rather than problematizing the labor markets that create abuse in the first place. The
widespread conformity to the idea that consumer power can be harnessed for good highlights
the fact that anti-trafficking, as a movement, was created by those who benefit from global
hierarchies of wealth and power. Anti-trafficking activists “are late capitalist culture’s
victors, who can deploy their advantages to achieve their vision of justice.” (Bernstein, 145).
By failing to challenge these hierarchies, the trafficking framework becomes simply another
part of how those in the highest global classes justify and reproduce their own power. It does
nothing to challenge the world economic order that results in gross inequities, consumptive
practices that justify and perpetrate these inequities, or even the privilege of its own
participants. It would be much more accurate to characterize the anti-trafficking movement
not as a fight against slavery, but a (redundant) fight for the globalization of capitalist labor
markets and the legitimization of “free” labor in contrast to “unfree” labor. This contrast
serves not those experiencing a spectrum of structural violence under the fluctuations of
global capitalism, but those who have always and already triumphed through the capitalist
economic order.
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Conclusion: Markets and Justice
Since its inception as a social problem over 100 years ago, the term “trafficking” has
been closely related to anti-immigrant, anti-sex work discourses. The persistence of this
relationship is so continuous throughout the history of anti-trafficking movements, the
ideological agendas that form around the anti-trafficking cause, and the policy response to
anti-trafficking advocates that it is not ridiculous to suggest that rather than having been
appropriated for nationalist or neoimperialist purposes, the trafficking framework arises from
these discourses. The concern with trafficking arises from concerns about global migration,
the growth of the sex industry, the increased permeability of borders (in both the real and
imagined sense), and collisions of privilege and unprivilege that these shifts have brought
about. By accessing the emotional history of enslavement—pulling it out of the context of
race, imperialism, and state complicity—the anti-trafficking movement has construed itself
as the only ones taking action against a hidden global phenomenon. As such, they are beyond
reproach, or even a degree of self-consideration. Critical perspectives that see trafficking as
“shaped by hegemonic and local patriarchies, globalized capitalism, and the widening gaps in
income and wealth, as well as by reconfigurations of empire under late-twentieth-century
globalization that reinscribed international hierarchies around notions of racial, religious, and
national difference” are completely “overshadowed by the criminal justice and sex
trafficking abolitionist paradigms” that rely on emotional knowledge and response
(Kempadoo, 2012, xix). As Lindquist points out, for every scholar or activist promoting a
more thoughtful approach to “trafficking,” “there is an Ashton Kushner or Mira Sorvino who
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finds critique confusing when there are 13-year old girls being raped and sold into sexual
slavery” (Lindquist, 322).
Much work in the realm of “anti-anti-trafficking” has involved engaging with the
celebrities, media stars, and advocates whose conviction of their own importance in ending
“modern day slavery” allows no room for reflection or dissent. The power of these discourse
makers is disturbing, especially given their influence over policy creation, and there is a
continued need to challenge the assumptions underpinning of the anti-trafficking crusade
through continued data-gathering about the effects of anti-trafficking on target populations,
as well as the collection and compilation of stories that complicate or contradict master
narratives about the nature of trafficking. However, while these efforts to diminish the power
and homogeneity of trafficking discourse are crucial, opposition and criticism does not in
itself constitute a substantial platform for an alternative to the anti-trafficking crusade. “Antianti-trafficking,” as Lindquist calls it, still legitimizes the trafficking framework even as it
critiques it. By engaging with anti-trafficking advocates, advocates for a more self-critical
approach are not challenging the underlying assumption that there exists in the world a
problem that can be accurately described as “trafficking.” As both qualitative and quantitative
research on the populations where trafficking supposedly occurs expands, it is becoming
increasingly evident that the term “trafficking,” no matter how it is defined, is distorted (or
even redundant) category of labor abuse. These projects, by aiming to include the wide
variety of experiences that abused migrant laborers have to offer in the narrative construction
of trafficking, have instead raised serious questions about the aptness of trafficking as a way
to understand particular migrant labor experiences: “the words of these migrants tell us not
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that there are no abuses or problems but that ‘trafficking’ is a woefully inadequate way to
conceptualise them.” (Agustín, 48).
The trafficking framework creates an isolate category of laborers who anti-trafficking
advocates believe can be reasonably qualified as “slaves.” However, the narratives of
migrants and exploited laborers demonstrate that the delimited abuses that qualify someone
as a “slave” in the eyes of the anti-trafficking crusade in fact rest “along a continuum of
forced migrant labor” and structural violence (Soderlund, 70). Even more nuanced or
inclusive understandings of the term still enforce divisions between ‘“trafficked’ and ‘not
trafficked but just-the-regular-kind-of-exploitation’ migrants” (Anderson and Andrijasevic,
141). Whether it is called “slavery” or “human trafficking,” this separate categorization of
particular kinds of labor abuses belies the myriad ways in which exploitation and violence is
inherent in labor markets, both licit and illicit:
Whether migrant or not, workers cannot be divided into two entirely separate and
distinct groups--those who are trafficked involuntarily into the misery of slavery-like
conditions in an illegal or unregulated economic sector, an those who voluntarily and
legally work in the happy and protected world of the formal economy. Violence,
confinement, coercion, deception and exploitation can and do occur within both
legally regulated and irregular systems of work, and within legal and illegal systems
of migration. (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 141)
In particular, the conflation between “trafficking” and “slavery” reinforces harmful binaries
between acceptable and unacceptable amounts of abuse. While the term “slavery” carries
important historical weight for black communities in America, black scholars have already
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suggested that as a re-usable legal category of abuse the term “slavery” has limited
usefulness. In Black Reconstruction in America, W.E.B. Dubois eschews the term “slave” in
favor of “black worker,” situating the abuses of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade in a larger
narrative about the costs that markets for labor elicit from those who are situated at the
bottom of global hierarchies. Transnational feminist Kamala Kempadoo underlines the
importance of this distinction for trafficking studies as well, arguing that contrary to “the
permanent and legal ownership of one human being by another and the power invested in the
owner to command that property at will” that defines historical, government-backed slavery,
“debt-bondage, indentureship, and forced labor are lodged in contractual, wage relations and
principles of free labor power and its market exchange value” (Kempadoo, 2012, xxvii). Yet,
through the framework of trafficking, these abuses are categorized as “slavery;” an aberration
of the free market, rather than central to it. The opposition between “slavery” and “freedom,”
where freedom is taken to mean the whole spectrum of violent abuse and exploited labor that
slavery does not encompass, is not neatly supported by the actual stories of migrant and
exploited laborers.
Instead, migrant and exploited laborers narrate experiences that demonstrate the
complicity of global systems of labor exploitation, rather than the individual actions of
“traffickers” or “modern day slavers.” While abuse by employers plays a role in many of
these stories, the mechanisms of the state, the limits that nationality or ethnicity places on
economic mobility, the workings of markets, and the high cost of poverty plays an equal or
larger role in their experiences of oppression. Rather than attributing exploitation to an
isolated phenomenon like “slavery” or “trafficking,” these discourses suggest that “political
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economy and structural violence in the form of failing economies, or employment
opportunities that favor certain genders, classes, or races can often be the bad guys that force
people to choose from a limited series of options” (Mahdavi, 35). Trafficking, by its common
definition, may be global but is not structural: the central idea of the anti-trafficking crusade,
that trafficking can be eradicated, belies the fact that it is a symptom of much more pervasive
and problematic inequalities. The isolation of trafficking as a discrete phenomenon and
therefore possible to abolish hinges entirely on ignorance of the broader context in which
trafficking occurs:
The ideology of anti-trafficking does not recognize that migrants have been displaced
by

practices that have resulted in the loss of their land and/or livelihoods through
international trade liberalization policies, mega-development projects, the loss of
employment in capitalist labor markets, or war...Most migrants are are victims of the
daily, banal operation of the global capitalist labor markets that are governed by

nationstates. (Sharma, 89-91)
The reliance of anti-trafficking movements on market strategies for seeking justice reinforces
the fact that the movement is decidedly ignorant of the structural inequalities created by the
postcolonial world economic order. “The economic and social links forged by colonization,
for example, are now reflected in strong patterns of migration from post-colonial countries to
their former colonizers” (Dinan, 65). Dislocating trafficking from a more historically rooted
and holistic understanding of international flows of labor, capital, and power severs the ties
that make global elites (the group who began the anti-trafficking movement in the first place)
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complicit in this order—the whole trafficking framework arises not from the need for justice,
but from the need to dislodge structural understandings of violence in favor of a model that
places the reason that locates the responsibility for suffering in individual actors, “traffickers”
and the employers that directly engage in the use of “slave labor.”
Corporations that join the anti-trafficking crusade do so despite (or perhaps because
of) the fact that they benefit from global disparities that produce vulnerable sources of labor.
In the United States, “low-waged migrant labour is permitted, and sought by employers,
precisely because it can be exploited” (Anderson and Andrijasevic, 141). Participating in a
global anti-trafficking movement is a convenient way for corporations to detract attention
from the benefits that they are currently reaping from low-wage labor, benefits that their
current growth is contingent upon. The race for cheaper and cheaper goods, which political
economists and other theorists have called “the global race to the bottom,” has led to a
reliance on unprotected and cheap labor. The corporations that contribute to the antitrafficking cause do so to conceal that “the demand for cheap goods and products has led
many corporations to become reliant on offshore labor activities that lend themselves to the
force, fraud, or coercion that undergirds human trafficking” (Mahdavi, 32). The reliance of
anti-trafficking organizations on corporate contributions specifically discourages the linking
of trafficking and production even as they fight the outcomes of this link. Within the
movement and without, the assumption “that corporations and capitalist forces rely on a
flexible oversupply of cheap labor to remain competitive in the market place is accepted
without much questioning” (Mahdavi, 33). It is a strategy of convenience and opportunity for
all involved:
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For modern-day abolitionists, the dichotomy between slavery and freedom poses a
way of addressing the ravages of neoliberalism that effectively locates all social harm
outside of the institutions of corporate capitalism and the state apparatus. In this way,
the masculinist institutions of big business, the state, and the police are reconfigured
as allies and saviors, rather than enemies, of unskilled migrant workers, and the
responsibility for slavery is shifted from structural factors and dominant institutions
onto individual, deviant men. (Bernstein, 144)
Excluding all narratives that do not support the qualification of trafficking as a “micro”
offense, the trafficking framework is a false front for the global classes that most benefit
from labor practices that produce “slave labor,” as part of a vast spectrum of other unethical
labor practices.
The trafficking framework rests upon these dichotomies: free and slaved, forced and
coerced, legal and illegal, formal and informal. However, this reliance on polar
understandings of choice occlude agency, casting victims of trafficking as incapable of
making choices and giving agency only to their rescuers. To move towards a more useful and
inclusive framework, “we have to grant the possibility that less empowered, or simply poorer
people, are not by definition passive victims. We have to realise that there is more than one
form of autonomy, the western one, which can only occur within western ‘progress’ and
modernity” (Agustín, 47). A more relevant and useful framework would re-characterize the
populations that trafficking framework currently brings under scrutiny as potential victims as
autonomous actors, negotiating agency for themselves within a bounded range of choices.
Rather than viewing particular kinds of migrants as without agency, “the concept of agency is
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instrumental in delineating the deliberate choices migrants make to move into one industry or
another, or to leave their home country in search of work” (Mahdavi, 13). Instead of viewing
abused and exploited labors as “voiceless” subjects who must have their freedom to make
choices returned to them, an alternative to “trafficking” would take into account the bounded
choices that migrants made that resulted in their exploitation, and the contexts of structural
inequality that these choices took place within. This kind of movement for the rights of
laborers would readdress the abuses currently qualified as trafficking as part of a wider
analysis of global labor practices produced by markets, and incorporate the agency (and the
circumscriptions of agency) that workers employ as they navigate these markets, not as
victims but as strategic actors, in their analysis.
Inclusion of sex work in the category of labor would be crucial to this alternative
framework. Rather than viewing sex work as either entirely exploitative or “just work,” such
an approach would take into account the contexts in which women (and increasingly, men)
choose sex work, and are marginalized and exploited through social structures. The attention
given sex work as a particular and escalated form of trafficking is entrenched in antitrafficking discourse. Even when organizations and legislation acknowledge the existence of
other kinds of trafficking, the categorization of sex trafficking as a different and special case
ultimately does little to serve the rights of laborers both within the sex industry and without:
The designation of prostitution as a special human rights issue emphasizes the
distinction between sex work and other forms of female, dangerous and low-status
labor, such as domestic or food service work, or work in factories and on the land. It
hides the commonality, the shared experience of exploitation, which links people in
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all such work. The distinction between ‘the prostitute’ and everyone else helps to
perpetuate her exclusion from the ordinary rights which society offers to others, such
as rights to freedom from violence at work, to a fair share of what she earns, or to
leave her employer. An employment or labor perspective, designating prostitution as
sex work, can bring this work into the mainstream debate on human, women’s and
worker’s rights. It also allows us to recognize that the sex industry is always not
where the worst conditions to be found. (Bindman, 66)
None of the abuses experienced by sex workers would be legal if sex workers were included
in the category of laborers. These abuses are “covered by existing international and national
labour and human rights standards, yet are not applied in the case of the sex
industry” (Doezema, 46). Exclusion from the fold of labor rights has not, as abolitionists
argue, brought much-needed attention to an abusive industry. Instead, they make an
unnecessary and obstructive distinction between sex work and other kinds of labor, excluding
sex work from wider analysis of the structural violence faced by global laborers within and
across borders.
The inclusion of sex work within a migrant and labor rights analysis attributes the
violence faced by sex workers not to the fact that they are sex workers, but to connect this
violence to larger structural analyses like racial violence, gender violence, and violence
against those (migrants and sex workers alike) who fall outside the realm of legally protected
labor. This would encompass a wide variety of narratives beyond the and the image of the
autonomous, liberated Western sex worker frequently used to illustrate arguments for sex
workers’ rights (Doezema 1998). The evidence that we have been able to gather on the lives
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of sex workers “shows variation, rather than uniformity, in the degree to which workers feel
exploited versus empowered and in control of their working conditions” (Weitzer, 453). The
inclusion of sex work into a labor rights framework is going to Sex workers are neither
uniformly liberated, nor uniformly exploited: their experiences are many and varied, and do
not fit into either narrative.
However, what these narratives are able to tell us is that the abuses that sex workers
experience are not necessarily sexual, but labor abuses: “even when migrants feel deceived,
they usually complain of working conditions, not the fact that the work is sexual, and they
often prefer to remain in the industry” (Agustín, 34-35). Viewing trafficking as the “rape” of
bodies is not mirrored in the narratives of sex workers who claim they do not feel oppressed
by “sex act itself, but rather...the conditions that sex workers must endure that often are
defined as the problem” (Kempadoo 2001, 44). Purely from a services perspective, “the
health problems of women in voluntary prostitution overlap with those experienced by
trafficked women in domestic violence situations, and migrant women in other forms of
informal, exploitive labor” (Limoncelli 2009, 263). When sex work is re-situated in a labor
rights analysis, the intersections of structure and agency that constitute sex work as a
mobility strategy for migrant women become apparent. Women, in particular migrant
women, are frequently “relegated to the informal and unregulated labor market--without
rights and without protection” (Marjan, 71). In reality, almost the only work migrant women
are allowed to do is in the entertainment sector or sex industry,” argues Marjan, but “at the
same time these sectors are the most marginalized, if not criminalized, in society” (72). It is
this marginalization, not the sexual nature of the work, that results in the most exploitation
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for sex workers. This is supported by the increasing body of evidence that women who are
identified as victims of trafficking frequently were trafficked within (not into) the sex
industry: “if it is recognized that the majority of those in the sex-industry who end up on
debt-bondage or slavery-like conditions were already working as sex workers, it is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that it is prostitutes whose human rights are being violated
on a massive scale” (Doezema 1998, 45; also see Busza et. al).
Concealing this violation is why trafficking, as a concept, was constructed as an
explanation for the abuses evident within the sex industry. Rather than viewing sex workers
as part of a wider category of exploited and marginalized laborers, “sex trafficking” became
the explanation for abuse--trafficking, at its heart, is really all about sex. Even as it has
expanded to include other kinds of labor, this expansion would be redundant if antitrafficking advocates were truly concerned about laborers rights. Instead, the fixation on sex
points once again to the relationship between the trafficking framework and neoliberal
ideology. Anne McClintock has argued that by selling that which men expect for free within
the construct of romantic relationships and marriage, prostitutes are working outside of
“male-dominated, market exchange” (McClintock, 82). Sex work has been a way for women
to access economic resources outside of the economic construct of the nuclear family, and it
is one of the only markets that has almost always been dominated by women, particularly
women “with both serious economic problems and lots of ambition” (Licia Brussa qtd. in
Chapkis, 932). Resistance to the inclusion of sex workers rights under the category of
laborer’s rights frequently has as much to do with destroying the market for sex as protecting
sex workers. This is reflected in the frequent call within the trafficking movement to end sex,
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despite studies that show that criminalization of demand cuts into the market power of sex
workers: “Because there are fewer clients, prostitutes have had to drop their prices and often
cannot afford to reject unstable or dangerous clients” (Chuang, 1719). No such end-demand
strategies are in place for other industries where “trafficking” occurs; it is a solution applied
specifically to sex work. An anti-trafficking movement that recognizes the right of sex
workers to labor protections is a contradiction in terms. Trafficking as a frame for
understanding labor abuse is constructed specifically around the separation of sex from other
forms of labor, with the goal of disrupting sex work as a means of “protecting” sex workers.
Sex workers defy both hierarchies of class and gender by engaging in their work, and a
legitimate market for sex would present a strong challenge to the traditional labor markets
that the trafficking framework reinforces, markets that trap migrant laborers (especially
women) at the bottom.
Taken in this light, an intersectional and inclusive labor rights movement would
understand agency within the sex industry, as within all industries, as raced and classed. This
more complex reading of the sex industry would have to acknowledge how markets for
commercial sex can be “conditioned by, or...sites of resistance to, further marginalization in
the contemporary global economy” rather than solely relying on the “choice” of sex workers
to engage in sex work as an explanation for why they do (Kempadoo 2001, 43). Dissociating
choice from structural factors that effect choice offers no explanation for why. However, this
does not occlude an understanding of sex work as an agentive strategy, and instead suggests
that migrant sex workers use their status as “exoticized subjects [to] devise strategies to
benefit from this situation to the best of their ability” (Kempadoo 2001, 33). The use of sex
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work as a strategy is also bounded by the fact that “for many Black and Brown women, and
increasingly for young men of color, sex work is more lucrative than Free Trade Zone work,
domestic service, export processing, farm work, or other hard manual labor” (Kempadoo
2001, 33). The comparative value of illicit labor is largely due to the undervaluing of legal
and acceptable forms of labor. The transnational feminist approach to sex work underlines
the necessity for a labor rights framework that goes beyond Western understandings of rights
that operate within binaries of liberty and oppression, and instead “locate women's labor
rights within a larger context of economic justice, an analysis of global processes including
transnational capitalism, and the way that these are gendered” (Limoncelli 2009, 265). A
movement for economic justice, that includes sex workers in the category of laborers, has the
potential to provide an understanding of the abuses that take place within the context of
global migration that goes beyond the trafficking framework, addressing the broader
problems that create these abuses rather than isolating them from contexts of race, gender,
colonialism, and economic class.

110
Bibliography
“About Us.” Polaris Project, 2014. Accessed 27 March 2014.
<http://www.polarisproject.org/>
Agustín, Laura. Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry.
London: Zed Books, 2007. Kindle Edition.
Ahlers, Mike. “Dramatic TV ads sell anti-human-trafficking message: ‘Dont be fooled.’”
CNN 19 July 2011. Accessed 27 March 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
americas/07/19 us.human.trafficking.campaign/>
Ahmed, Aziza and Meena Seshu. “We have the right not to be ‘rescued’…”:when anti
trafficking programmes undermine the health and well-being of sex workers.’ The=Anti-Trafficking Review, Issue 1 (2012): 149-165.
Anderson, Bridget, and Rutvica Andrijasevic. “Sex, Slaves and Citizens: The Politics of Antitrafficking.” Soundings, vol. 40 (December 2 008): 135–145.
Anderson, Bridget, and Rutvica Andrijasevic. “Anti-trafficking Campaigns: Decent? Honest?
Truthful?” Feminist Review 2009, no. 92 (2009): 151-155.
Aradau, Claudia. Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics Out of Security. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Bernstein, Elizabeth. “The Sexual Politics of the ‘New Abolitionism.’” Differences, Vol. 18,
No. 3 (2007): 128-151.
Berry, Kathleen. Female Sexual Slavery. London: Prentice Hall, 1979.

111
Bhaba, Jacqueline. “The ‘Mere Fortuity of Birth’? Children, Mothers, Borders, and the
Meaning of Citizenship.” Migrations and Mobilities. Ed. Judith Resnik and Seyla
Benhabib. New York: New York UP, 2009. 196-237.
Bindman, Jo. “An International Perspective on Slavery in the Sex Industry.” Global Sex
Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition.
The Boston Globe. “Bush brings faith to foreign aid.” October 8, 2006. Accessed March 22
2014. <http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/10/08
bush_brings_faith_to_foreign_aid/>
Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Evangelicales Sway White House on Human Rights Issues Abroad.”
New York Times, 26 October 2003. Accessed March 22 2104. <http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/world/evangelicals-sway-white-house-on-humanrights-issues-abroad.html>
Busza, Joanna, Sarah Castle, and Aisse Diarra. “Trafficking and health.” British Medical
Journal, Vol. 328 (June 2004): 1369-1371.
Call + Response. Dir. Justin Dillon. Fair Trade Pictures, 2008.
Chapkis, Wendy. “Trafficking, Migration, and the Law: Protecting Innocents, Punishing
Immigrants.” Gender and Society, vol. 17, No. 6 (December 2003): 923-937.
Chin, Christine. Cosmopolitan Sex Workers: Women and Migration in a Global City. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2013.
Chuang, Janie A. “Rescuing trafficking from ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 158
(2010): 1655-1728.

112
CNN. “Transcript of Bush U.N. Address.” 23 September 2003. Accessed 22 March 2014.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/09/23/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/>
“The CNN Freedom Project.” CNN, 2012. <http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.com/>
Contreras, Russell. “US officials begin push against human trafficking.” Seattle Times 10
November 2009. Accessed 27 March 2014. <http://seattletimes.com/html/
nationworld/2010244231_apushumantraffickingsigns.html>
DeStefano, Anthony. The War on Human Trafficking: U.S. Policy Assessed. Piscataway, NJ:
Rutgers UP, 2007.
Dinan, Kinsey Alden. “Globalization and national sovereignty: From migration to
trafficking.” Trafficking in Human$. ed. Sally Cameron and Edward Newman. New
York: United Nations UP, 2008. 58-79.
Ditmore, Melissa. “Trafficking in Lives: How Ideology Shapes Policy.” Trafficking and
Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work, and Human
Rights. 2nd Ed. Ed. Kamala Kempadoo, Jhyoti Sanghera, and Bandana Pattanaik.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012. 107-126.
Doezema, Jo. “Forced to Choose: Beyond the Voluntary v. Forced Prostitution Dichotomy.”
Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition. ed. Kamala Kempadoo and
Jo Doezema. New York: Routledge, 1998. 34-50.
Doezema, Jo. “Loose Women or Lost Women?: The Re-emergence of the Myth of White
Slavery in Contemporary Discourses of Trafficking in Women.” Gender Issues
(Winter 2000): 23-50.

113
Doezema, Jo. “Now You See Her, Now You Don’t: Sex Workers at the UN Trafficking
Protocol Negotiation.” Social and Legal Studies Vol. 14 (2004): 61-89.
Ehrenreich, Barbara and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex
Workers in the New Economy. New York: Henry Holt and Co, 2002.
Farrell, Amy and Stephanie Fahy. “The problem of human trafficking in the U.S.: Public
frames and policy responses.” Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 37 (2009): 617-626.
Footen Bromfield, Nicole. “Underlying Motives, Moral Agendas and Unlikely Partnerships:
The Formulation of the U.S. Trafficking in Victims Protection Act through the Data
and Voices of Key Policy Players.” Advances in Social Work Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer
2012): 243-261.
Gallagher, Anne. “Improving the Effectiveness of the International Law of
HumanTrafficking: A Vision for the Future of the US Trafficking in Persons
REports.” Human Rights Review, Vol. 12 (2011): 381-400.
Grant, Melissa Gira. “Unpacking the Sex Trafficking Panic.” Contemporary Sexuality, Vol.
47, No. 2 (March 2013): 1-6.
GovTrack. Civic Impulse, LLC. <http://www.govtrack.us.>
Haynes, Dina F. “Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to
Protect the Victims of Trafficking and do Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers.”
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): 221-272.
Hua, Julietta. Trafficking Women’s Human Rights. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2011.
Hughes, Donna and Janice Raymond. “Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States.”

114
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women. March 2001.
H.R. 3244. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (in Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000), 106th Cong. (2000).
H.R. 2620. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 108th Cong., first
session (2003).
H.R. 972. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, 109th Cong. first
session (2006).
H.R. 898. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Title XII of Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013), 113th Cong., first session (2013).
International Labour Office, Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour. “ILO
Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology.” 2012. Accessed 27
March 2014. <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/
documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf>
Jones, Maggie. “Thailand’s Brothel Busters.” Mother Jones, November/December 2003.
Accessed 22 March 2004. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/11/thailandsbrothel-busters>
Kerber, Linda. “The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States.”
Migrations and Mobilities. Ed. Judith Resnik and Seyla Benhabib. New York: New
York UP, 2009. 86-133.
Kapur, Ratna. “Cross-border Movements and the Law: Renegotiating the Boundaries of
Difference.” Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on
Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights. Updated 2nd Edition. Ed. Kamala

115
Kempadoo, Jhyoti Sanghera, and Bandana Pattanaik. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012.
25-42.
Kempadoo, Kamala. “Women of Color and the Global Sex Trade: Transnational Feminist
Perspectives.” Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001):
28–51.
Kempadoo, Kamala. “Globalizing Sex Worker’s Rights.” Canadian Women’s Studies, Vol.
22, No. 304 (2003): 143-150.
Kempadoo, Kamala. “Introduction.” Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New
Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights. Updated 2nd Edition. Ed.
Kamala Kempadoo, Jhyoti Sanghera, and Bandana Pattanaik. Boulder, CO:
Paradigm, 2012. vii-xlii.
Limoncelli, Stephanie A. “The trouble with trafficking: Conceptualizing women’s sexual
labor and economic human rights.” Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 32
(2009): 261-269.
Limoncelli, Stephanie. The Politics of Trafficking: The First International Movement To
Combat the Sexual Exploitation of Women. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010.
Lindquist, Johan. “Beyond anti-anti-trafficking.” Dialectical Anthropologt Vol. 37, No. 2.
(2013): 319-323.
Luibhéid, Eithne. Entry Denied. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Mahdavi, Pardis. Gridlock. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2011.
Mahdavi, Pardis. From Trafficking To Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem. New
York: Routledge, 2014.

116
McClintock, Anne. “Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law.” Boundary, Vol. 2
(Summer 1992): 70-95.
Miriam, Kathy. “Stopping the Traffic in Women: Power, Agency and Abolition in Feminist
Debates over Sex-Trafficking.” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring
2005): 1-17.
Molko, David and Lisa Cohen. “Google joins fight against slavery with $11.5 million grant.”
CNN, 14 December 2011. Accessed 28 March 2014. <http://www.cnn.com/
2011/12/14/us/google-anti-slavery-grant/>
Moschella, William E. “To The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.” 24 September 2003.
Accessed 22 March 2014.
<http://brennan.3cdn.net/46e14203736808de8b_66m6iyhy8.pdf>
Musto, Jennifer Lynne. “What’s in a name? Conflations and contradictions in contemporary
U.S. discourses of human trafficking.” Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 32
(2009): 281-287.
Musto, Jennifer Lynne. “The NGO-ification of the anti-trafficking movement in the United
States: a case study of the coalition to abolish slavery and trafficking.” Sex
Trafficking, Human Rights, and Social Justice. ed. Tiantian Zheng. New York:
Routledge, 2010. 23-36.
Napier-Moore, Rebecca. “Revisiting Feminist Participatory Action Research: Because ‘A
Woman’s Life Is Richer Than Her Trafficking Experience.” Trafficking and
Prostitution Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work, and Human

117
Rights. 2nd Ed. Ed. Kamala Kempadoo, Jhyoti Sanghera, and Bandana Pattanaik.
Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2012. 231-248.
O’Brien, Erin, Sharon Hayes, and Belinda Carpenter. The Politics of Sex Trafficking: A
Moral Geography. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Informal Note by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights.” Fourth session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 1 June 1999.
Accessed 24 March 2014. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/
background/session4.html>
Ong, Aihwa. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham, NC:
Duke UP, 1999.
Pei, Li. “Little-known visa for trafficking victims is chronically underused.” Cronkite News,
9 December 2013. Accessed 20 March 2014. <http://cronkitenewsonline.com/
2013/12/little-known-cumbersome-visa-for-trafficking-victims-is-chronicallyunderused/>
Raymond, Janice. “Prostitution as violence against women: NGO stonewalling in Beijing and
elsewhere.” Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1998): 1-9.
Raymond, Janice. “The New UN Trafficking Protocol.” Women’s Studies International
Forum, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2002): 491-502.
Sanghera, Jyoti. “Unpacking the Trafficking Discourse.” Trafficking and Prostitution

118
Reconsidered: New Perspectives on Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights. 2nd Ed.
Ed. Kamala Kempadoo, Jhyoti Sanghera, and Bandana Pattanaik. Boulder, CO:
Paradigm, 2012. 3-24.
Sassen, Saskia. “Women’s Burden: Counter-geographies of Globalization and the
Feminization of Survival.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2 (Spring
2000): 503-524.
Soderlund, Gretchen. “Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades against Sex
Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition.” NWSA Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn
2005): 64-87.
Stead, William T. “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon I: The Report of Our Secret
Commission.” The Pall Mall Gazette. 6 July 1885. Accessed 22 March.
<http://www.attackingthedevil.co.uk/pmg/tribute/mt1.php>
United Nations, General Assembly resolution 55/25. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, (15 November 2000).
Accessed 26 March 2014. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/>
U.S. Department of Justice. “Criminal Section Selected Case Summaries.” Accessed 24
March 2014. <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/selcases.php#humantrafficking>
U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. June 2013. Accessed 24 March
2014. <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/index.htm>
U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations with Venezuela.” 2 December 2013.

Accessed

24 March 2014. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm>
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the

119
Judiciary and the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives. “Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to
Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad.” GAO-06-825, July 2006.
U.S. Office of the Press Secretary. “Presidential Proclamation — National Slavery and
Human Trafficking Prevention Month, 2012.” President Barack Obama. Accessed 20
April 2014.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/30/presidentialproclamation- national-slavery-and-human-trafficking-prevent>
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Trafficking in Women and Children in East
Asia and Beyond: A Review of U.S. Policy. Hearing, 9 April 2003 (S. Hrg. 108-105).
Accessed 27 March 2014. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg89090/
html/CHRG-108shrg89090.htm>
Vance, Carol S. “States of Contradiction: Twelve Ways to Do Nothing about Trafficking
While Pretending To.” Social Research Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall 2011): 933-948.
Waxman, Henry. “To The Honorable Alberto Gonzales.” 13 April 2006. Accessed 22 March
2014. <http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/
20050512094218-07313.pdf>
“We Are Not For Sale.” Not For Sale Campaign, 2014. <http://www.notforsalecampaign.org/
about/>
Weitzer, Ronald. “The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and
Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade.” Politics & Society Vol. 35, No. 3 (2007):
447-475.

120
Wijers, Marjan. “Women, Labor, and Migration: The Position of Trafficked women and
Strategies for Support.” Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition. ed.
Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema. New York: Routledge, 1998. 69-78.

